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Abstract
Since the early 1960s, when the majority of African countries gained
independence from colonial powers, the continent has been in turmoil. Conflicts
have been extensive, and detrimental to economic, political and above all, social
development. Today, Africa is under more pressure than ever to find solutions for
these conflicts.
The situation is complicated by the complex and difficult challenges brought on
by a rapidly globalising world. Also conflicts have often been characterised by
internal, as well as regional proportions. Coupled with this, the threats facing
Southern Africa are of such a nature that they transcend national boundaries,
and have a tendency to effect entire regions as opposed to individual states.
Thus threats no longer endanger states, but rather their people.
fn view of this, conflict resolution requires a regional approach as well, in order to
ensure a viable and lasting solution. This thesis attempts to evaluate the
contribution of regional co-operation to conflict resolution in Southern Africa. Two
concepts imperative to this evaluation are regionalism and security. Both are
examined and juxtaposed. The author determines that the concepts have
changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War period, and that new
regionalism and new security approaches need to be considered in addressing
conflicts, since traditional interpretations have become obsolete, particularly in
the developing world.
Furthermore, an examination of the international, regional and sub-regional
organisations, concerned with conflict management on the continent, is carried
out. The United Nations and the Southern African Development Community,
together with their efforts in Southern Africa analysed.
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The author takes the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a case
study, and concludes that the persisting conflict has ensued precisely because
regional co-operation was inadequate. The states and leaders involved did not
take into account the regional dimensions of the conflict, and also ignored threats
to human security. Regional co-operation was at a minimal, and involvement has
until now been predominantly unilateral and statist, marked by personal interests,
and not those of the population.
iv
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Opsomming
Sedert die vroeë sestigerjare, toe die meerderheid Afrikalande onafhankliheid
van koloniale magte verkry het, was die kontinent in onrus gehul. Dit was
omvattende konflik - konflik wat nadelig was vir ekonomiese, politieke en veral
sosiale ontwikkeling. Vandag, meer as ooit tevore, is Afrika onder druk om
oplossings te vind vir hierdie konflikte.
Die situasie word gekompliseer deur die uitdagings gestel deur 'n vinnig
globaliserende wêreld. Die konflik word dikwels deur interne sowel as
streeksafmetings gekenmerk. Hiermee saam is die bedreigings wat op Suidelike
Afrika 'n invloed het van so 'n aard dat dit nasionale grense ignoreer en die
geneigdheid het om totale streke, in teenstelling met individuele state, te
beïnvloed. Hierdie bedreigings stel dus nie state in gevaar nie, maar eerder hul
mense.
Om 'n lewensvatbare en blywende effek te hê, benodig konflikoplossing dus ook
'n streeksbenadering aan te neem. Hierdie tesis poog om die bydrae van
streekssamewerking, ten einde konflikoplossing in Suidelike Afrika te
bewerkstellig, te evalueer. Beide word ondersoek en in verband gebring. Die
skrywer bevind dat die konsepte drasties verander het sedert die einde van die
Koue Oorlog tydperk, en dat nuwe regionalisme en nuwe sekuriteit benaderings
oorweeg moet word, aangesien tradisionele interpretasies verouderd, veral in die
ontwikkelende wêreld, is.
Verder word internasionale, regionale en sub-regionale organisasies wat
gemoeid is met konflikhantering op die kontinent, ook ondersoek. Die Verenigde
Nasies en die Suidelike Afrika Ontwikkelings Gemeenskap (SADe), tesame met
hul pogings in Suidelike Africa, word geanaliseer.
v
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Die skrywer maak gebruik van die konflik in die Demokratiese Republiek van die
Kongo as gevallestudie, en kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat konflik ontstaan het
juis omdat regionale samewerking nooit werklik gerealiseer het nie. Die betrokke
state en leiers het nie die streeksdimensies van die konflik in ag geneem nie, en
ook menslike sekuriteit bedreigings ignoreer. Regionale samewerking was
beperk tot In minimum, en betrokkenheid was tot nou toe oorwegend eensydig
en staats georienteerd, en gekenmerk deur persoonlike belange, en nie dié van
die bevolking nie.
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1.1 Problem Statement
Chapter 1:
Introduction
The African continent has been continuously submerged in violent animosities
since the start of the withdrawal of colonial powers in the 1960s. Precious few
states have been able to escape political instability and economic degradation. In
Southern Africa, Lesotho has witnessed several coups, Mozambique has been
ravaged by civil war, boundary conflicts have arisen between Namibia and
Botswana, and the democratisation process has stalled in Swaziland.
In Zimbabwe a mockery has been made of democracy, with unrelenting land
invasions by the War Veterans Association and an explicit hindrance of the
principles of free speech and human rights in this year's presidential election.
The antagonism doesn't end there. The civil war in Angola reached international
proportions, as well as unflagging domestic ones, although it has abated since
the death of rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. In the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), despite the periods of relative stability, situations
of antagonism have not been completely eliminated, and prospects for peace
remain uncertain despite the withdrawal of some foreign troops from the country.
The different conflicts vary in intensity and character but all have been extremely
detrimental to stability on the continent. During the Cold War era, African
countries were preoccupied with attempting to eliminate threats to state security.
These took the form of struggles for freedom and independence against external
colonial control, and became synonymous with Africa of that period. In the post-
Cold War period, however, threats to security have changed in character, and
both inhabitants and states are threatened. Certain African states have become a
threat to the security to their own populations because they are in danger of
collapsing.
1
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Threats facing the populations of Southern Africa include civil and ethnic unrest,
diseases such as AIDS and malaria, drought, unemployment, and famine (Van
Aardt, 1993: 84), as well as agricultural degradation, corruption and
mismanagement, and enormous debt burdens (Mills, 1994: 5). Conflicts have
therefore, become multifaceted, driven by poverty, corrupt governance and
mercantilistic exploitation of scarce resources.
The fact that present-day threats are predominantly non-military and internal, is
important to consider, because they transcend the traditional notion of security.
The conventional approach to security, focusing exclusively on national safety
and state military concerns (Booth, 1994: 3) is largely irrelevant to the developing
world. The Cold War period fuelled by realist thinking, advocated the prominence
of the state (Buzan, 1991: 21), and emphasised national security, war, balance of
power and defence alliances. The state was the primary referent of security, and
required a military-centred paradigm to achieve its objectives.
Today, however, an alternative approach to security needs to be considered if
the people of Southern Africa are truly to be guaranteed freedom from threat.
Africa must demonstrate the will to rely upon political rather than military
responses to problems (Neethling, 1999: 32). The new security approach should
be 'about and for the people' (Van Aardt, 1996: 23). Unless threats to human
security are identified and considered primary to national interests, many
conflicts in Africa will remain unresolved.
A common feature of all the previously mentioned threats is borderlessness,
which transcends the boundaries of states and societies. Threats to human
security are not longer constrained by national boundaries but are, instead,
dilemmas affecting whole regions. As a result, national attempts at possible
solutions could be, and have in the past, proved futile because these threats can
easily spill over into neighbouring states, and exceed individual state capabilities.
2
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Regional problems need to be addressed through regional means (Maclean,
1999: 945-946). A regional approach to address security issues in Southern
Africa, however, has been difficult to establish.
It is against this background that the topic of the thesis was determined, namely:
to assess the role of regional co-operation in the resolution of the conflict in the
ORC. The thesis will not focus on the conceptualisation of conflict resolution. It
will rather suggest, that resolution of conflicts in Southern Africa, cannot be
sought without substantial attention given to regional co-operation and a broader
approach to security.
In order to assess regional co-operation it is important to look at the concept of
regionalism, since this concept implies the convergence in a region along various
dimensions, the most prominent of which are economic, cultural, social and
political (Hettne & S6derbaum, 1998: 7). In the post-Cold War period the concept
has undergone dramatic changes and, has evolved into a new wave of
regionalism. Exploring both the old and new approaches to regionalism will yield
an understanding of the concept. More importantly it will assist in classifying the
levels, manner and reasons for regional co-operation and how these have
changed as well.
Conflict in Africa has been of an intrastate and interstate nature. The former
refers to security threats that surpass national boundaries, while the latter refers
to security threats that endanger the state itself. As already mentioned, security
threats affect both the inhabitants and their states. In other words, the post-Cold
War era has also produced a changing concept of security, one that needs to be
analysed against a backdrop of the conventional approach. By exploring the old
and new approaches to security, more appropriate parameters can be
recommended for regional security arrangements to follow, in order to
adequately address the security needs of their populations and their member
states.
3
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For a practical approach to security, the United Nations (UN) will be examined,
because it is the primary world body concerned with the maintenance of
international peace and security. Although it is not the focus of the study, the UN
is important to consider, because all regional arrangements must comply with the
principles of the UN, and adhere to the rules and regulations set out for them in
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, if they desire to be regarded as legitimate
(Bennett, 1995: 232). Furthermore, regional organisations are prohibited from the
use and threat of the use of force without the authority of the Security Council,
excluding a few exceptions (Dugard, 2001: 413).
After an examination of the two concepts, the thesis will attempt to establish a
connection between the new approaches to regionalism and security, and show
why it would be advantageous for regional security organisations to advocate
both concepts simultaneously in order to provide lasting solutions in conflict
situations.
Due to the magnitude of UN involvement throughout the world, the confines of
the thesis are restricted to Southern Africa. In this region the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) is the only regional organisation equipped to
deal with conflicts. Although SADC was initially established as a regional
economic initiative, aimed at achieving greater development and economic
growth in the region, threats to security constituted a stumbling block for
development. This led to the formation of SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence
and Security (OPDS) in 1996, which was to address conflicts in the region
through regional co-operation and the new security approach (Breytenbach,
2000: 85). The OPDS will be assessed to determine whether it managed to apply
the central tenets of the new approach to human security.
The ultimate suspension of the Organ in 1997, further substantiates the
importance of analysing the UN in the realm of the thesis, since regional
organisations, either as a result of ineffective security structures or the lack of
4
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necessary funds, have depended heavily on the UN. In fact many regional and
state-based initiatives aimed at conflict resolution have called on UN support,
without adequate UN involvement in discussions (Malan & Boshoff, 2001: 3-4).
Communication and interaction between the UN and regional organisations will
also be discussed, since it has affected efforts in addressing conflict situations in
Southern Africa. An inconsistency between the UN and regional organisations
can be attributed to the vague reference to regional arrangements in the UN
Charter, a dilemma that did not exist at the time of the UN's inception, but one
that evolved with the changing circumstances in the world arena, and remains
unresolved today. An assessment will be made of whether both organisations
upheld the principles of new security, which is especially important since both are
state-based.
Although the UN and SADC will be examined separately, to determine their
functioning and subsequent weaknesses and strengths, the main focus will be on
the conflict in the DRC and how both organisations worked to address and
resolve the conflict. The conflict in the DRC has reached unrelenting proportions
and is a prime example of one characterised by regional dimensions, and threats
to human security and the security of the state. Due to the conflict's incessant
character, the thesis will briefly explore the colonial origins of the conflict, and
ascertain its present-day dimensions.
SAOC's involvement in the ORC conflict will be evaluated, to determine whether
it was a concerted regional one, and in terms of which regional security
approaches it acted, the old state-centric approaches or the new human security
approaches. The UN was called upon to assist in the conflict and the
organisation has made substantial contributions in the working towards a
resolution of the conflict in the Congo, although its contribution has not been
without problems.
5
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Regional initiatives, such as the Lusaka Peace Process and the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue (ICO), aimed at addressing and resolving the conflict were launched by
countries in Southern Africa, and will be reviewed to determine whether they
were SADC inspired or bilateral initiatives. The latest of these regional initiatives
was the Pretoria Agreement of 2002. The Agreement is important to consider
because it managed to bring together previously unco-operative parties. As the
situation in the DRC continues to be an unresolved issue, the thesis will not
consider events after the Pretoria Agreement of July 2002.
An assessment will be made of whether the parties involved in the DRC conflict
and the initiatives launched, adhered to the principles of new security and
whether there was indeed any regional co-operation in the matter, and if not, did
that result in a failure to resolve the conflict. Finally, the thesis will propose that in
order for the conflict to be addressed and resolved successfully, a functioning
regional security organisation is of utmost importance, one that will follow the
principles of new security and truly co-operate on a regional level.
1.2 Purpose and Significance of Study
The purpose of the study is three-fold:
Firstly, to identify the differences between old and new regionalism through a
conceptualisation of the concept. This will allow for a historical and sequential
presentation of regionalism and will ascertain, not only the forms of regional co-
operation and integration, but also the various types of regional organisations.
Coupled with the conceptualisation of regionalism, an assessment of the notion
of security will be carried out. This will, once again, illustrate substantial
differences between the old and new security thinking. More importantly, it will
establish that new security thinking, places people as the primary referents of
security, and this is of utmost importance particularly in developing Southern
Africa. A conceptualisation of both concepts will assist in linking the two.
6
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Secondly, to consider and evaluate the international and regional organisations
that have been present in Southern Africa, namely the UN and SADC. An
examination of their conflict mechanisms will be made to determine where they
complied with the principles of the human approach to security so important in
SouthernAfrica, or whether state-centric approaches prevailed.
Thirdly, to examine and explore the conflict that has prevailed in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and to assess whether a broader approach to security was
followed. Furthermore an assessment of the involvement of the various parties
will be made, in order to determine which regional security approaches
dominated, and whether international, regional, and national involvement was co-
ordinated or added to the complexity of the conflict. This will assist in establishing
what future actions should be taken to bring about peace and stability.
The study is significant because it attempts to determine why regional security
initiatives have not been successful in addressing and resolving conflict in
Southern Africa. It applies old and new security approaches to a relatively recent
case of conflict resolution in the DRC, and furthermore, examines the role of
regional co-operation in that conflict. The significance of the DRC is such, that it
has effected the Great Lakes region, and repercussions of the conflict also
emanate over much of Southern Africa.
1.3 Methodology
The thesis takes the form of an extensive literature study, which utilises a
qualitative approach towards the research. It is firstly a descriptive study, asking
the questions 'how' and 'who', and secondly an explanatory study determining
'why'. It is also an inductive study, because it began with a topic and
undetermined concepts, that needed to be refined in order to identify a
preliminary relationship.
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Existing literature, concerned with various aspects of the research topic, was
consulted in order to obtain a thorough background, and deepen the conceptual
framework of the research. The literature review also served to identify the latest
developments in this field of research, and was beneficial in pinpointing
deficiencies and weaknesses, as well as establishing more sources for data
collection.
The reading material, used as the primary source of research, deals with two
principal concepts, namely regionalism and security. Both concepts are
presented as changing phenomena, that are continuously being shaped by
current global trends and activities and, therefore, need constant revision.
The literature on regionalism was examined first against a backdrop of
universalism (Bennett, 1995: 232), where the latter became especially prominent
with the formation of the United Nations in the post-World War II period.
The debate between the idealist and realist schools of thought is particularly
important, because it illustrates the divergent responses to the question of
conflict resolution and security promotion, which ultimately led to a contest
between universal collective security and regional security (Van Nieuwkerk,
2001: 3). Hettne and Sóderbaum (1998: 6-21) elaborate on the new wave of
regionalism against a backdrop of the old concept of regionalism. A further
account of regionalism also indicates the various forms of regional co-operation
and integration, with a 'loose' functional type of co-operation at one end of the
spectrum, and a 'tight' neo-functional type of integration at the other
(Breytenbach, 1999: 70-72).
The literature concerned with security, is divided into various categories. The first
of these can be understood from a realist perspective (Buzan, 1991), and refers
to the conventional concept of security from the Cold War period, which
propagated a statist-military approach. The period was characterised by simple
defence alliances. The second bulk of literature criticises the conventional
8
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approach. The literature also points to the transformation of the world in the post-
Cold War era, and demands a modification of the traditional concept of security,
one that will link political and military matters to economic and social ones. Here
the liberal school of thought is dominant. Booth (1994), Mills (1994), Van Aardt
(1993 & 1996) and Vale (1994) all advocate this standpoint.
Another category of the security literature is that, which deals with the developing
world and the identification of numerous, current threats. The literature reflects
the views of Ken Booth (1994), who was at the forefront of establishing
alternative notions of the traditional sense of security, and whose publications
have made important and valuable contributions to the international security
debate, and have resulted in the instituting and expansion of new security
thought in the developing world, such as Southern Africa.
Academic journals, essays and occasional papers concerned with the regional
security debate in Southern Africa have also been used in the study. These
include Africa Insight, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Third World
Quarterly and the South African Journal for International Affairs. Articles issued
by institutions dealing with matters of international and regional security, such as
the Institute for Global Dialogue, were also consulted. Authors, whose work and
opinions have been applied in this thesis, are representative of the region of
SouthernAfrica, as well as from beyond.
The research is primarily descriptive and no empirical data or field research was
used or undertaken. A substantial amount of data was gathered at the JS
Gericke Library at the University of Stellenbosch. The internet was also a
significant source of information giving access to sources not available in the
library, and providing links with web-sites of various governmental and non-
governmental institutions.
9
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Chapter 2:
New Regionalism and New Security
2.1 The RegionalismApproach
2. 1. 1 Old and New Regionalism
Regionalism, is both complex and multidimensional. The one actuality that
scholars of the discipline agree on, is that it is immensely difficult to find common
and compatible definitions and theories of regionalism. This uncertainty extends
into the old as well as the new regionalism approaches, but the distinction
between the former and the latter does bring clarity to the concept.
In their essay on the new regionalism approach, Hettne and Sëderbaum (1998:
6-9) distinguish between the old and new approaches. This offers more tangible
characteristics of old and new, important in understanding both approaches. It
also presents regionalism as a concept in progression, indicating how the
approach has changed and how it might be effected by future world trends.
Following World War I, the major powers found it necessary to establish a
security system, that would effectively curb any situations that could lead to
further insecurity and conflict. Thus, the debate between idealists and realists, on
an adequate mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution, began. Idealists
propagated a universal collective system, while realists emphasised the
important role that great powers could play in providing security for themselves
and for smaller states (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3). Although the League of Nations,
the world's first attempt at collective security failed, idealist thinking resurfaced
strongly with the formation of the United Nations in 1945 (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001:
3).
10
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During the time of the formulation of the UN Charter, however, those favouring
regionalism were powerful enough to demand an accommodation for regional
arrangements within the universal framework (Bennett, 1995: 232). Bennett
(1995: 232-233) refers to regionalism under the United Nations Charter, and
states that there was an acknowledgement that regional organisations could play
an important role in promoting the aims of international peace and security.
Proposals to provide economic and social specifications for regional
arrangements were defeated, however, and although Chapter VIII does makes
provisions for the functioning of regional organisations, it is limited to the role that
such organisations can play in the maintenance of international peace and
security. In fact, Chapter VIII contains only three articles concerning regional
arrangements (Bennett, 1995:233).
This vagueness and lack of precise definition of regional arrangements in the
Charter (Malan, 1997: 16), coupled with the UN's failure to fulfil it's promise of
universal stability (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3), led to the emergence of regionalism
as an alternative mechanism for conflict management. Article 51, concerned with
the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence against an armed attack,
makes no mention of regional arrangements but, as Bennett (1995: 234)
maintains, the reference to collective self-defence has allowed states to form and
utilise alliance systems for this purpose.
The alliance systems, referred to by Bennett (1995: 234-235), were structured
according to the realist thinking prevalent among the American-led Western
alliance, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), as well as the
Soviet-communist alliance, namely the Warsaw Pact. The establishment of
alliances in these two camps led to a bipolar power distribution.
The intent of the UN was that universalism should take precedence over
regionalism in the case of any conflict of jurisdiction between a regional
11
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organisation and the UN (Bennett, 1995: 233), and as a result multipurpose
regional arrangements were made subordinate to the UN if they expected to be
regarded as legitimate players in the global arena (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3).
Article 51, however, served as an "escape hatch from the obligations of
universalism" (Bennett, 1995: 234), and the alliance systems, although
internationally accepted, were not consistent with the values of collective
security.
Tension and hostility between the two superpowers of the Cold War era
entrenched the bipolar structure even further (Balaam & Veseth, 2001: 185). The
conflict which ensued between the West and the East, although essentially an
ideological struggle, featured a strong military contingent (Balaam & Veseth,
2001: 185).
According to Hettne and Sëderbaum (1998: 6), old regionalism began in the
1950s and should be understood within a particular context and time, namely that
of the Cold War period. The previously mentioned bipolar structure dominating
the world, moulded old regionalism into a concept with a simple and narrow focus
on trade agreements and security alliances (Hettne & Soderbaum, 1998: 7). Old
regionalism was imposed from above and outside, and was also referred to as
hegemonic regionalism (Hettne, 1998: 7).
Although trade agreements and security alliances were both examples of old
regionalism during that period, they constituted different organisations. Defence
alliances were formed by the superpowers without yielding to any international
organisations, while trade agreements took their mandate from the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) formed in 1947, and secondly from the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
From the perspective of the developing world, or states commonly referred to in
that period as Third World countries, regionalism of the Cold War period was
12
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Initially, closed regionalism was practised in developing the South through the
protection of infant industries against the North, using national and regional
barriers (Handley, 1998: 13). Only once industries were strong and resistant
enough to eompete in the global world, would the barriers be discarded. The
attempt of development through protectionism did not succeed, however, and
gave rise to industries even more unsuited for competing in the global eeonomy
(Handley, 1998: 3).
designed to address an unjust international trading and economic system
(Handley, 1998: 3). While submitting to the UN on security matters, UNCTAD
was formed by the Group of 77, who spoke for the developing world on eeonomic
issues.
This economic protectionism, coupled with the ideological political diversion of
the Cold War, led to the ineffectiveness and ultimate failure of old regionalism
(Handley, 1998: 3). Although there was a preliminary opposition of GAIT by
UNCTAD, the failure of protectionist policies made the latter less confrontational.
At present UNCTAD co-operates fully with the World Trade Organisation (WTO),
which is the successor of GAIT.
Another element of old regionalism, was the introduction of functional eo-
operation on specific economic issues. Breytenbach (1999: 70-71) makes
reference to functional eo-operation as a 'loose' type of regional co-operation,
with states acting as primary members. This loose eo-operation was
characterised by the creation of multipurpose organisations, such as the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) formed in 1963, that eoncerned themselves
with broad aims and activities, linking political and military matters, with economic
and social issues (Bennett, 1995: 236).
Breytenbach (1999: 71) explains, however, that functional eo-operation, which
took the form of regional eo-operation, constituted only one end of the spectrum.
13
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Tighter market integration, characterised by the formation of customs unions and
common markets, represented the other neo-functionalist end (Breytenbach,
1999: 71), and marked the beginning of the new wave of regionalism.
This new regionalism, although also state-driven took its mandate from the
authority of GATT, as opposed to that of the UN (Breytenbach, 1999: 71). This
occurred as a result of a movement from functional co-operation towards neo-
functional co-operation, which resulted in, not only tighter forms of cohesion, but
also in an increased emphasis on multilateral and regional projects (Balaam &
Veseth, 2001: 218).
Regional organisations concerned with economic and security issues, were now
accountable to the WTO and the UN respectively. This evoked a certain
incompatibility, because a single arrangement would have to adhere to the
principles of the WTO regarding economic issues, whilst at the same time follow
the principles of the UN when addressing security concerns.
Nevertheless, old regionalism faded away in the 1970s and was replaced by this
new wave, which began emerging in the mid-1980s (Hettne & Sëderbaum, 1998:
6). As with old regionalism, the new phenomenon is both shaped and induced by
the prevalent world structure, which at present is characterised by the
"interrelated structural transformation of the global system" (Hettne &
soderoaurn, 1998: 6). The time period as well as the content of regionalism has
changed dramatically, and it continues to be a process still very much in the
making.
Contrary to the specific and simplistic nature of old regionalism, new regionalism
is a world-wide phenomenon that is taking place in many areas of the world
(Hettne & Sëderbaurn, 1998: 7). Hettne and Soderbaum define the new
regionalism approach as, "implying the change of a particular region from relative
heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard to a number of dimensions,
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the most important being culture, security, economic policies and political
regimes ...convergence along these dimensions may be a natural process or
politically steered or, most likely, a mixture of the two" (Hettne & S6derbaum,
1998: 7).
In other words new regionalism is more multifaceted, extending over many
perimeters in a region, which results in change and modification of that region.
Furthermore, the process occurs concurrently at various levels of analysis
(Hettne & S6derbaum, 1998: 7). This is reiterated by Marchand et al (1999: 902),
who state that regionalisation takes place simultaneously at three levels, namely
the world system, the inter-regional sphere, and the internal pattern of a single
region. This has resulted in a system of diversified patterns of interaction
(Marchand et aI, 1999: 904), also known as 'variable geometry'.
Furthermore, a separation of ideology and empirical process is also of relevance.
The term regionalism would pertain to the ideology of regionalism, namely the
"urge for a regionalist order" (Hettne & S6derbaum, 1998: 9). Regionalisation
indicates the actual empirical process. It is important to understand that
regionalism as an ideology can exist without a parallel process of regionalisation,
and visa versa (Hettne & S6derbaum, 1998: 9). As far as the process of
regionalisation is concerned, Handley (1998: 2) makes the definition more
concrete by stating that the process is implemented through the introduction and
implementation of the same policies in a region, and may lead to a larger political
and economic unit.
While examining the concept of regionalism, it is important to ascertain what is
meant by the word 'region'. A region is determined in relation to the degree to
which it constitutes a distinct identity or unity, and how this unity allows it to
discern itself from other areas or regions (Hettne & S6derbaum, 1998: 10). If the
process converges in more than one field, as Hettne and S6derbaum (1998: 10)
maintain, it's distinctiveness increases and the region is more discernible.
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Marchand et al (1999: 900), state that with deepening co-operation among
regional actors, 'region-ness' or 'regionality' will emerge. This occurs because
convergence in certain spheres, which is defined as being cultural affinity,
political regimes, security arrangements or economic policies, allows the region
to develop a relative sameness. The more spheres experience this sameness,
the more the region will develop a particular identity, which ultimately results in
the creation of a regional identity. Hettne and Sóderbaum (1998: 10) echo this
very thought by stating that "when different processes of regionalisation in
various fields converge within the same area, the distinctiveness of the region in
question, that is the level of regionness, increases".
Hettne and Sóderbaum's (1998: 7) definition also focuses on the instigation of
the process, and they conclude that although it can be directed from above, it will
most likely be a mixture of the former, combined with spontaneous causes
emerging from the region itself. One defining characteristic of new regionalism is
that the process includes a multitude of actors from state and non-state sectors.
New regionalism has begun to recognise that regional interactions and
organisations should not only focus on states (Marchand et aI, 1999: 897).
Marchand et al maintain that along with governments, civil societies and
business sectors are adding to the growing multidimensional group of actors
involved in the process (Marchand et aI, 1999: 897). Although, governments are
almost always actively involved in regionalisation, actors from these other
spheres are becoming equally important (Marchand et el, 1999: 900), and could
ultimately become the 'drive' behind the process.
The many regionalisms and regionalisations, result in competing definitions of
regions. Sóderbaum (1998: 76-77) clarifies this confusion to a certain extent, by
defining the Southern African region. He affirms that a certain amount of flexibility
must be maintained in the description, and therefore outlines the region with a
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minimum and a maximum definition, the former referring to the SACU area, and
the latter referring to the SADC area (Sóoerbeum, 1998: 76-77).
SADC is considered the maximum because it reaches beyond the geographical
borders of Southern Africa by including Mauritius and the Seychelles, for
example (Sëderbaum, 1998: 77). Actual practices are also important
considerations in determining the confines of a region, because informal actions
contribute to increased regional interaction as much as formal ones (Marchand et
al, 1999: 905-906).
2.1.2 Regionalisation and Globalisation
The new wave of regionalism is not the only phenomenon that has been gaining
momentum and scope in the international sphere. Handley (1998: 1-2), refers to
two parallel developments that are defining the current world structure, namely
globalisation and regionalisation. The relationship between regionalisation and
globalisation is important to consider, not only because both forces are
prominent, but also because they appear to be contradictory.
A rapidly globalising world has, in the past decade, seen a liberalisation of
markets through an astonishing increase in the mobility of trade and finance
across national borders (Marchand et ai, 1999: 898), driven by the multilateral
rules of the WTD on the one hand, and the role of multinational corporations on
the other. Together with a transfer of knowledge and technology, the world is no
longer defined or inhibited by geographic location, but has become rather
'borderiess' (Hettne, 1998: 48). Regionalism, on the other hand, can be explained
as an instrument to enhance or protect the role of the state (Hettne &
Sëderbaurn, 1998: 8).
Hettne and Sëderbaurn (1998: 8), however, view this relationship as being more
'symbiotic' than contradictory. They term the new regionalism approach as being
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extroverted, and not inward looking as that of the old approach. Although the new
approach may in fact enhance the role of the state, in antithesis to the old
protectionist regionalism, the approach is globally orientated (Hettne &
S6derbaum, 1998: 8-10). This is referred to as 'open regionalism' and constitutes
one way, that states can cope with global transformation.
The new regionalism approach can indeed be viewed as a mechanism for states
to address challenges, brought on by a rapidly global ising world. In an attempt to
prevent marginalisation, that would otherwise occur due to a lack of resources or
power from an individual national level, states 'pool sovereignty' in order to
increase their capacity in the global world (Hettne & S6derbaum, 1998: 8). States
recognise that unless goods are competitive in the global market place, they are
not worth making (Clapham, 1998: 24-15). Promoting competitiveness is thus
essential, and far easier through joint initiatives by states. The global political
economy is indeed becoming globalised, but at the same time regionalised to
address the daunting challenges of the former (Marchand et ai, 1999: 898).
2. 1.3 Classifying Regionalism
In his article on new regionalism in Southern Africa, S6derbaum (1998: 76)
maintains that it is not always the levels of regional co-operation that are
important, but rather the reasons and manner in which co-operation takes place.
The conceptualisation of regionalism is, however, so complex and intricate, that
many different types of regionalisms occur. To make identification and
assessment easier, the various types of regionalisms should be divided into
specific categories.
Hettne and S6derbaum (1998: 12-14) identify five main categories of regionalism
namely, intergovernmental regional co-operation, state-promoted regional
economic integration, market and society induced regionalisation, regional
convergence and coherence, and finally, regional identity. The first two
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categories are formally state induced initiatives, while the third category is more
informal and undirected. The categories indicate convergence ranging from least
to most, beginning with the first category, namely co-operation and ending with
the fifth, namely regional identity, encompassing state, market and civil society.
Co-operation is essentially functional and project orientated (Breytenbach, 1999:
71), and refers to collaboration through practical and technological means in non-
political spheres (Marchand et ai, 1999: 901). Functionalists believe that an ever-
increasing amount of economic and social co-operation, will eventually promote
interaction and common values in the political arena (Bennett, 1995: 16-17).
Loose regional co-operation among states is an example of functionalism, and is
characterised by organisations, councils, committees and associations
(Breytenbach, 1999: 71).
Integration is market orientated and based on various degrees of free-trade
(Breytenbach, 1999: 71). Integration begins with tariff reductions that may result
in preferential trade agreements (PTA), free trade areas (FTA), customs unions,
common monetary areas and common markets. States, the primary members of
regional organisations, may ultimately form a single currency bloc. This would
result in a conceding of sovereignty, and the possibility of economic and political
supranational institutions, such as parliaments, central banks and courts of
justice (Breytenbach, 1999: 70). These various stages of market integration and
political supranationalism, are part of neo-functionalism, because they exhibit
tighter forms of coherence than functional co-operation.
Bennett (1995: 235-236) identifies four main groups of regional organisations,
based on the nature and scope of their functioning, and the degree of integration
that is sought. The first of these are the multipurpose organisations, so labeled,
because they have broad ('loose') aims and activities concerning not only
political and military matters, but economic and political concerns as well
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(Bennett, 1995: 236). Examples of multipurpose organisations would include the
OAU, the League of Arab States, and the Council of Europe of 1949.
Alliance-type organisations, the second group, are those with military and
political orientations, whose main concerns are to provide security against
external actors. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact are
defence alliances that fall into this category (Bennett, 1995: 236). The third group
encompasses functional organisations, whose main concerns are to promote
('tighter') economic, social or political co-operation, with little or no interest in
security matters. This group includes SADC, the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the European Coal and Steel Community of 1952 and
the European Community of 1957 (Bennett, 1995: 236-238).
The fourth group is that of United Nations Regional Commissions, placed in a
distinct category, due to the fact that regional commissions form a link between
the universal and regional systems, and promote universal objectives in specific
geographical areas, thus fitting into no other category (Bennett, 1995: 236).
Regarding regional integration, Olivier (2001: 41) identifies two broad categories.
The first is characterised by Ernst Haas as "a process whereby a new
institutional centre is established, one that replaces previously existing sovereign
states". This leads to supranationalism in a region. The second form of regional
integration is easier to establish because it does not demand the relinquishing of
sovereignty, but rather requires states to increase compatibility concerning major
values. This type of integration, referred to by Karl Deutsch as a "pluralistic
security community", requires governments to accommodate each other's needs
and behaviours.
Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 3) refers to regional security communities, as a conception
of regionalism that became prominent during the 1950s and 1960s. The
understanding behind regional security communities is based on the liberal
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school of thought, and is expressed through regional integration theory. Although
there was never any formal link between integration and security, a connection
was established through two central ideas.
The first is the notion of spillover, prominent in functionalist theory, which
advocates that if regional groups can successfully foster economic integration,
regional actors will learn, over time, to resolve conflicts peacefully and co-operate
on security issues (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3-4). This would then lead to regional
security. The second of the two central ideas, security community, refers to the
end product of such integration. If regional actors can successfully integrate to
the point where the group develops strong and stable institutions and practices, it
could assure stable expectations of peaceful change within its population (Van
Nieuwkerk, 2001: 4). This will lead to a security community, as referred to by
Deutsch.
Whatever the type of regional integration, coherence along one or more
dimensions in a region will ultimately lead to regional convergence and
coherence. This process, according to Hettne and S6derbaum (1998: 13-14), can
be recognised by two primary occurrences. The first is when a region as a whole
plays a defining role in the relations of the rest of the world, and the second is
when the region serves as the organising basis across a wide range of issues
within the region.
Finally, a distinction between formal and informal interaction should be made,
and the influence of both must be analysed. As mentioned previously, informal
relations in a region, refers to activities such as daily border movement and
focuses on ordinary people and their actual daily activities.
In contrast, geographical proximity, and formal political and economic co-
operation, make up the other end of the spectrum. It is obviously easier to record
and analyse the latter, but both processes have an impact on regional
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connections (Marchand et aI, 1999: 905-906). Informal regionalisms, or "strong
trans-state flows", are consequential because they may undermine formal co-
operation schemes (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3).
2.2 The SecurityApproach
2.2.1A Changing Concept
The notion of security has changed tremendously over the past few decades,
and the conventional definition, centering around the military-political
perspective, has been replaced by new approaches (Van Aardt, 1993: 82).
According to Buzan (1991: 18), security can be defined as "the pursuit of
freedom from threat" and this in essence, is the broadest sense of security. With
this as the foundation, Van Aardt (1996: 19) explains that the concept of security,
demands a revision in every era and should in fact be continuously altered,
because "changing conditions and circumstance influence the content given to
security". What may be a serious threat to security now, could have been
inconsequential in the past.
The conventional approach to security has become largely irrelevant particularly
for the developing world. Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 82) writes that Africa's people
continue to suffer from a multitude of threats to their security, such as poverty
and underdevelopment, and unless adequate attention is granted to these
particular threats, security arrangements in the region will remain ineffective. Van
Aardt (1993: 84) echoes this thought by stating that a one-dimensional focus on
security in Africa will never take into account the many crises being experienced
throughout the continent. Civil unrest, migration, diseases, drought,
unemployment and famine are only some of the problems she mentions that
pose a threat to the developing world.
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The Cold War period, fuelled by realist thinking advocated the prominence of the
state (Buzan, 1991: 21), which emphasised national security, war, balance of
power and defence alliances, and coined phrases such as 'mutually assured
destruction', 'flexible response' and 'containment' (Ngubane & Solomon, 2002:
58). The state was the primary referent of security, and required a military-
centred paradigm to achieve its objectives.
Traditionally, security focused almost exclusively on states and their military
concerns (Booth, 1994: 3), and conventional definitions of the concept centred
around national security and defence. Buzan (1991: 16) cites other academics to
reiterate this point. Michael Louw, for example, defines national security as
including traditional defence policy, as well as non-military actions of a state,
while Giacomo Luciani states that "national security may be defined as the ability
to withstand aggression from abroad" (Buzan, 1991: 17).
The conventional notion of security, although dominant throughout the twentieth
century, has been challenged by alternative approaches from as early as 1705
(Ngubane & Solomon, 2002: 58). German Philosopher Leibniz asserted the need
for a state to provide common security for its citizens, while French philosopher
Montesquieu, stated that true political freedom would only occur if people were
secure (Ngubane & Solomon, 2002: 58).
Since then a broader conceptualisation, recognising non-military threats to
security, has been propagated by several academics. McNamara proposed a
definition of security that did not solely focus on military stability. His argument
was that "security is development, and without development there can be no
security" (Van Aardt, 1993: 2). Galtung, in turn, identified four major threats,
namely war, hunger, repression and eco-disaster (Van Aardt, 1993: 82). The
United Nations acknowledged as early as 1980, that military strength alone
cannot provide real security (Van Aardt, 1993: 83).
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Buzan (1991: 19-20) identifies five major threat categories that, as he expressed,
affect the security of human collectives. These are military, political, economic,
societal and environmental. Van Aardt (1993: 92) adds a sixth dimension to
Buzan's list, namely development security, which according to her is of utmost
importance to Southern Africa. She defines development security as tackling the
extensive poverty, inequality and unemployment within the region by means of a
concerted development and investment programme. She also states that
development and environmental security are the two dimensions that are the
basis of building and sustaining (Van Aardt, 1993 : 92).
Ken Booth (1994: 5) argues, that the dilemma of traditional definitions of security,
was that they equated security with state security, while Buzan elaborated that
state security was often achieved at the expense of human security particularly in
the developing world (Ngubane, 2002: 60).
Peter Vale (1994: 4) asserts that security should be understood as security for
the people, and that development should focus directly on and be woven around
people, both as groups and as individuals. The economic, political and social
dimensions of the individual, the family, communities, local and national life, and
the international community should all be taken into account in order to elaborate
on the concept of security (Gumbi, 1994: 16).
These dimensions broadening the concept of security, are not only important for
finding possible solutions to conflict, but are also of importance when considering
causes of conflict. Greg Mills (1994: 4) writes that there are few conditions of
insecurity on the African continent that are of a "direct external military nature".
Factors creating conditions of civil unrest include environmental and agricultural
degradation, drought, diseases such as AIDS and malaria, refugee crises, ethnic
conflicts, civil strife and famine, corruption and mismanagement, and enormous
debt burdens (Mills, 1994: 5). Mills' (1994: 4) extensive list mentions many
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serious internal and non-military threats facing Africa, that may result in
conditions of insecurity, and will, no doubt, have an enormous impact on conflict
management in the future.
Similarly, natural resources are increasingly becoming causes of conflict on the
continent. In her illustration of the importance of environmental security, Van
Aardt (1993: 92-93) refers to the urgent need for water, which is so heavily in
demand that it is becoming an even scarcer resource, and will therefore require
adequate management so as to prevent future conflict over its demand and
supply.
Van Wyk (1998: 14) reiterates the same notion of water availability and its
contribution to regional instability. She emphasises that because no society can
survive without water, coupled with the fact that water almost always crosses
international boundaries and tends to be unevenly distributed, makes it an
important regional security issue, one that is often neglected (Van Wyk, 1998:
11).
Although, as Turton (2000: 166) explains water wars have been rare, "the
connection between water and political instability" is not. There is a great deal of
conflict, or potential conflict, over water resources (Turton, 2000: 166). Since
water is a migrant commodity, joint dependency on rivers indicates that the
national security of all states is linked, and security from the traditionally national
perspective needs to be revised (Van Wyk, 1998: 11-12).
In addition to water, other natural resources have gained a primary position in
situations of conflict. Reno (2001: 3) writes that economic interests have become
very dominant in post-Cold War conflicts, and that state resources are often used
by many rulers as a means to retain power.
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Evidently Southern Africa at present, is confronted by a series of threats that
transcend the conventional notion of security. These threats are no longer
reflective of the realism school that emphasises state-based security, but
transcend from liberal thinking, which advocates human security as the principle
focus. In order to successfully resolve these threats, national governments and
regional security arrangements should take the new security approach into
account, and identify and address all threats to human security.
The new approach should not, however, reject military or political dimensions,
but recognise that all six dimensions are equally important in attaining ultimate
security in any region. Buzan (1991: 16) notes that the various threats to security
exist alongside one another, and need to be equally considered.
Mills (1994: 8-9) demonstrates that economic development, for example, is not
necessarily a guarantee for security. According to him the reverse is true, namely
that regional economic integration is dependent on political and military stability.
In other words, all dimensions of security are linked and must be considered
simultaneously in order to remove situations of insecurity.
This type of liberalist thinking, emphasising the importance of the individual
rather than focusing exclusively on the state, led to a realisation of the need to
link security with economic and political co-operation. The Helsinki Accord of
1975, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(Dugard, 2001: 241), included principles guiding, not only co-operation, but also
relations among states, fundamental freedoms and human rights (Bennett, 1995:
398). It propagated the need to develop economic co-operation and security
matters simultaneously and not in isolation. This would require the acceptance of
a multi-level, multidimensional concept of security. (Van Aardt, 1993: 93).
26
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.2.2 Human Security
In striving towards a multi-level and multidimensional approach to security, an
important consideration is for whom this security is intended. Van Aardt (1996:
23) states that the question of "whose security?" should be answered
unequivocally with "security of people". By making people the primary focus of
security, it will not only allow for a broadening of the concept to include non-
military threats, but will also make it possible to identify the complex relations
between the various threats (Ngubane & Solomon, 2002: 60).
Nowadays, incumbents and academics concerned with issues of security agree
that security is "about and for people", and that states or national governments
should no longer be the main recipients of security (Van Aardt, 1996: 23). This
broader human security approach, which began emerging in the post-Cold War
era, is particularly relevant to the developing world, such as Southern Africa,
where security revolves around problems of promoting and sustaining
development (Maclean, 1999: 943).
The state's role in the provision and control of security is never completely
reduced, however, and although human security should be striven for, the state
remains a crucial actor in the process. However, if the state is no longer the
primary focus it should not, in actual fact, be allowed to act without influences
from civil society and those it is aiming to protect.
Also the broadening of the security approach, in many instances, is due to
present day internal domestic conflicts which point to the fact that states
themselves are sources of insecurity (Sódercaurn, 1998: 80). This "new security
dilemma" as referred to by Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 1), occurs because states are
individually inadequately equipped to deal with transnational and international
developments. State-centric regional co-operation could, therefore, become
completely obsolete.
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Sandra Maclean (1999: 943) writes that a well developed civil society is crucial
for any realistic efforts to build peace in Southern Africa. She states that regional
dynamics have been part of the tension in many cases of conflict in Southern
Africa and therefore play an important role in the solution (Maclean, 1999: 945-
946).
A strong civil society, is thus essential, one developed and independent enough
to act as a 'watchdog' over the performance of the state (Van Aardt, 1996: 24). In
an earlier article Van Aardt (1993: 93) also expresses the significance of a
bottom-up approach that would start with developmental and environmental
security. According to her, a more inclusive approach to security entails a
bottom-up perspective as opposed to the top-down approach in conventional
thinking (Van Aardt, 1993: 93).
Coupled with this, Southern Africa has turned towards regional affiliations as
possible protective strategies against growing economic and social insecurities.
According to Maclean (1999: 945), a regional solution will only be effective,
however, if a certain amount of 'regionness' is attained. Regionness as discussed
previously, is what emerges through deeper co-operation between regional
actors (Marchand ef aI, 1999: 900). Convergence along various dimensions in a
region may result in a regional identity (Marchand ef aI, 1999: 900) and allows for
smoother regional action.
There are of course many factors that may impede on regionness such as
inequalities amongst countries (Mills, 1994: 9) in a particular region, or
incompatible values (Olivier, 2001: 41). This is why the strengthening of civil
society is so important. The activities of non-governmental organisations (NGO),
for example, are often most effective when co-ordinated at the regional level and
may, therefore, advance the quality of regionness (Maclean, 1999: 949).
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Civil society may contribute to regionness, through NGOs that are directly
involved with or advocate a regional approach to security. Others that are not
directly involved with security issues, but pool their expertise and resources from
an entire region, or organise regionally for regional benefits, also establish and
strengthen regional bonds. Regionness can also be enforced through civil
society, when external actors deal with NGOs on a regional basis due to
economies of scale (Maclean, 1999: 948).
2.3 Assessment
After conceptualising regionalism and security, and ascertaining the new
approaches to both concepts, a link can be formed between the two.
The new wave of regionalism points to a convergence along various dimensions
in a region, which illustrates a greater affinity towards regional co-operation and
ultimately integration, unlike old regionalism that was merely concerned with
simple trade agreements and defence alliances. Within the realm of new
regionalism, regional organisations are more willing to co-operate and integrate,
which may lead to a certain amount of regionness, and the eventual development
of converging stances on certain matters. It must be remembered, however, that
while co-operation is easily achievable among partners sharing a common
system of values and the same level of development, this is not so when
significant differences are evident (Solomon & Cilliers, 1996: 26).
Achieving a common regional stance, is precisely what is required for a working
security agenda for the region, especially considering the new threats to human
security that are imminent in Southern Africa. Serious issues, such as stateless
people, refugees, and illegal immigrants go beyond the conventional confines of
security because they transcend national borders. Threats to security can
originate internally from within a region, and not solely arise from external
danger. At the same time, the continent is experiencing wars of an interstate and
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intrastate nature, which suggests that both states and their populations are in
danger. A broader, regional approach to security is necessary, since states are
no longer capable of protecting their citizens individually (Solomon & Cilliers,
1996: 6), and should not, therefore, remain the primary recipients of security.
Solomon and Cilliers (1996: 6) assert that by making people the primary referent
of security, it becomes possible to identify threats to human security at sub-
national, national and transnational levels. This is particularly important since a
great deal of threats facing Southern Africa are of a regional nature. Common
regional security will not be possible, unless it is pursued jointly by all states in
the region in a multilateral and co-ordinated method (Van Aardt, 1993: 89).
Intimate and co-ordinated regional co-operation is necessary for the provision of
security, because of the mutual needs of people across state borders.
Regional security arrangements must give attention to regional threats if they
desire to be successful in the provision of security and stability. To this end,
state-centric regional co-operation is becoming obsolete, because regional
solutions to new security threats will only be effective if regionness is attained.
This cannot be done through regional state co-operation alone.
New regionalism recognises that regional interaction should not only focus on
states but on all spheres, and that informal practices also contribute to
regionness. In this regard, new regionalism is inseparable from new security,
because of the comparability between both concepts on the views of the
importance of civil society. In many cases the nature and sources of problems,
like the responses, are regional, and internal conflict situations have important
regional and civil society dimensions (Maclean, 1999: 945-946).
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The proposition of a regional security arrangement for Southern Africa is of
utmost importance, but it would have to be one that works towards regional co-
operation and ultimately integration, and seriously comprehends and follows the
principles of a broader approach to security.
There are no doubts as to the many advantages that regional economic co-
operation holds for participating states. In Southern Africa, the importance of
economic co-operation and integration are manifold. Integration can expand
trade and enlarge local markets, as well as allow increased efficiency in the
industrial sector by taking advantage of economies of scale. As far as investment
is concerned, regional integration permits countries with small scale economies
to pool resources and attract large-scale foreign direct investment (Editorial
African Security Review, 2001: 1).
The question remains whether regional economic co-operation can successfully
transpire into regional security initiatives, and whether the latter holds similar
advantages as the former. An initial response to these questions is illustrated in
the Kampala Declaration of 1991 adopted by the OAU in 2001, which states that
security, stability and development in Africa are so interconnected, that only a
simultaneous effort, albeit difficult and complicated, will provide a resolution of
the issues (Mills, 1994: 12). Economic growth in any given country is dependent
on the resolution of threats pertaining to unstable economic and political
systems in the region (Mills, 1994: 10).
Addressing security and development simultaneously, the objective of the New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), is an arduous task, and one that
will not be achieved through the capabilities of an individual state. Joint
initiatives, will bring more success. Regional co-operation and integration is also
significant, because internal problems spill over into neighbouring states, causing
problems for regions in their entirety (Olivier, 2001: 43).
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Furthermore, a higher level of regionness implies a lower degree of eonflict
because of increasing co-operative relations (Hettne & Sëderbaum, 1998: 19). In
the developing world, where eonflict and development feed on each other,
regional eo-operation for development would reduce the level of eonflict, and
stability would allow for further development eo-operation.
With Africa's ingrained belief in unity, regional integration should be "an almost
natural policy choice" and a pragmatic method of tackling social and security
issues, as well as a vital building block towards a more extensive pan-African
ideal (Olivier, 2001: 40-43). Looking at various regional security initiatives in
Southern Africa, however, points to a past characterised by mixed results.
Regional eo-operation remains important to adequately address security threats
currently present in Southern Africa. Chapter 3 examines the United Nations, the
world's only organisation concerned with the maintenance of international peace
and security, and also Southern Africa's only regional organisation equipped to
deal with security issues. A general background of these organisations is
presented to ascertain how they function, and how they are integrated in the
global security arena. Furthermore an attempt is made to determine whether
these two organisations advocated and followed broader security threats, and
whether, in the case of SADC, regional co-operation in terms of new regionalism
prevailed.
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Chapter 3:
Security Structures in Southern Africa
3.1 The United Nations
3. 1. 1 Collective Security: the Charter of the United Nations
The end of World War I strengthened the idea of a universal collective security
system (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3). Collective security, as broached in chapter 2,
assumes that all nations share a primary interest in maintaining peace, and that
threats to peace anywhere, should be the responsibility of all members of the
international system (Fetherson, 1994: 144), which should promote co-operation
through international organisations, and not through defence alliances. For
collective security to work effectively certain conditions are therefore necessary.
The most important of these is a commitment on the part of all members of the
international community to place the maintenance of peace above all other
interests, whether national or bilateral. The emphasis is on multilateralism.
Members must be able to reach consensus on the initial co-ordination of the
system, as well as on later collective agreements when identifying situations
which threaten the peace, and be able to organise subsequent responses.
Universality is a significant and necessary characteristic of the system, because
it increases the available resources within the organisation. More importantly,
with a larger membership, it becomes harder for any single and powerful state to
defy the collective (Fetherson, 1994: 144-146). In other words, bilateralism, or
even worse, unilateralism, is disapproved in any system of collective security.
The League of Nations proved unsuccessful, but a second attempt was made at
the end of World War II, and the UN, was formed in 1945, to promoted idealist
principles and a collective security system (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3).
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Article 1 (1) of the United Nations Charter states that the primary purpose of the
UN is "to maintain international peace and security" by means of "effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace" (Malan,
1997: 16). "Conformity with the principles of justice and international law" is also
expected by members in order to bring about "adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace"
(Malan, 1997: 16).
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations states that members are
prohibited from the use and threat of the use of force (Dugard, 2001: 413).
Excluding the few exceptions such as anticipatory, responsive or collective self-
defence, humanitarian intervention, and defence of nationals, states cannot
exercise the use of force against another sovereign without the authorisation of
the Security Council (Dugard, 2001: 413-425).
The Security Council, consisting of five permanent and 10 non-permanent
members, holds the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security (Charter of the United Nations, articles 23 & 24). The powers
granted to the Security Council are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX,
and members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council (Charter of the United Nations, articles 24 & 25). Article 27
states that all decisions on non-procedural matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members, but this has to include the concurring votes of
the permanent members (Charter of the United Nations, articles 27).
Chapter VI of the UN Charter, concerned with the peaceful settlements of
disputes, declares in article 33 that parties to any dispute, which may endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall firstly "seek a solution
by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
34
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
choice" (Charter of the United Nations, article 33). If parties fail to settle disputes
through peaceful means, article 37 indicates that they shall refer it to the Security
Council (Charter of the United Nations, article 37).
The Security Council is permitted to take legally binding decisions under article
25 directing member states to impose economic sanctions or to use force to
maintain international peace (Dugard, 2001: 402). The Security Council
determines under article 39 of Chapter VII, whether a particular situation
constitutes a "threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression"
(Dugard, 2001: 403). Article 41 authorises the Security Council to direct member
states to take measures not involving the use of force to implement decisions
(Dugard, 2001: 404). Should article 41 be inadequate or insufficient in resolving
situations, article 42 provides that the Security Council may use "...air, sea or
land forces...to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Dugard,
2001: 405).
The Secretary General of the UN has an important role to play, particularly in the
promotion of certain issues through addresses, and the submission of reports to
the Security Council (Annan, 2000: 1). Dag Hammarskjold was very involved in
promoting peace in the ORC. Boutros Boutros Ghali was responsible for the
adoption of the concept of peace-building (or post-war reconstruction, such as
landmine clearance) by the UN in 1991. More recently, Kofi Annan has been
working towards peace in Africa and at his insistence the Security Council has
often been required to take action. It was during his term that MONUC was
deployed in the ORC in 2001.
3.1.2 Accommodation of Regional Arrangements in the UN Charter
Regional organisations can be accepted as collective security organisations in
some of their functions (Fetherson, 1994: 145). This depends on whether they
incorporate the fundamental conditions of consensus and commitment to peace
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Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, was designed specifically to deal with
regional arrangements. Although the contribution that regional organisations can
make in the maintenance of international peace and security has been accepted
and deemed important, in practice regional bodies are primarily concerned with
economic and social issues (Bennett, 1995: 233). Furthermore, Chapter VIII has
not been amended since the inception of the organisation and remains poorly
developed (Malan, 1997: 16). The fundamental provisions concerning regional
arrangements in the Charter, are found in only three articles (Bennett, 1995:
233), which hardly constitutes the decisiveness that is in fact required.
and collective response. Also the membership should encompass most states in
the region, and attention should be directed against threats from within the region
rather than from the outside.
"Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security ...provided that such arrangements or agencies
and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations" (Charter of the United Nations, article 52).
In fact, as specified in the previous section, parties to disputes are encouraged to
use regional or any other means of their choice to resolve local disputes, before
referring them to the Security Council (Charter of the United Nations, article 33).
But if, and when enforcement action is required for the settling of such disputes,
the matter must be referred to the Security Council for the granting of
authorisation (Charter of the United Nations, article 53).
Article 54 further specifies that the Security Council "shall be kept at all times
informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace
and security" (Charter of the United Nations, article 54).
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The difference between collective security and collective defence is that,
although both are types of sub-regional security co-operation, the former refers to
member states seeking to prevent conflict between each other, while in the latter
states ally with each other for joint defence against external threats (Van
Nieuwkerk, 2001: 88). Defence alliances, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
remained prevalent throughout the Cold War period for the reason that even after
the establishment of a universal body, such as the United Nations, states were
still reluctant to relinquish their sovereignty (Fetherson, 1994: 147).
Article 51, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, declares that states have the
right to take measures against armed attack for collective as well as individual
self-defence. Although no specific mention of regional arrangements is made in
this article, the reference to collective self-defence has allowed for the creation
and use of regional organisations in matters of collective security (Bennett, 1995:
234). Article 51 does emphasise the authority of the Security Council in matters
of self-defence, but the article has, as Bennett (1995: 235) argues, "become an
escape-hatch from the obligations of universalism toward a revival of an alliance
system contributing to the ...fragmentation of any potential global unity".
Hegemonic regionalism, which emphasised the role that great powers could play
in ensuring peace and security, remained dominant throughout the Cold War
period (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3), but did not reduce the influence of the UN in
matters pertaining to security, or reduce the organisation's capacity as "perhaps
the most influential political body in the world" (Taylor, 1997: 1).
Uncertainty arises, however, due to a lack of explicit reference in the Charter to
either peacekeeping or peace support operations (Malan, 1997: 16). In fact as
Ogden (2000: 33) writes, the UN was not designed for peacekeeping and its
strengths lie in agenda setting, i.e. preventative diplomacy and peace initiatives.
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Peacekeeping has only existed since 1956, when UN Peace Keeping Forces
(PKF) were sent to act in response to the Suez Crisis (Malan, 1997: 18). The
PKFs were introduced by the Secretary General on the insistence of Canada.
The term 'peacekeeping' was formalised in 1965, when the UN General
Assembly established the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
(Malan, 1997: 18). To this day, however, the UN Charter does not refer to PKF.
Coupled with this, the UN failed to establish a United Nations Force as envisaged
by article 43, which would have been placed under the command of a Military
Staff Committee provided for in article 47 (Dugard, 2001: 405). One reason for
the UN's failure to fully develop its peacekeeping potential, was the inefficiency of
the Security Council, which resulted from the permanent members' use of the
veto right (Malan, 1997: 18). Because no force was established, peace-keeping
operations undertaken by the General Assembly and the Security Council have
been established in terms of ad hoc agreements between the UN, and
contingents from contributing countries (Dugard, 2001: 406-408).
The failure to establish formal UN Forces has also resulted in an inadequate
distinction between peacekeeping without the use of force, and enforcement
action (Dugard, 2001: 408). UN operations dispatched to maintain peace in war
torn areas have had to resort to force for reasons of self-defence, and to provide
civilians with humanitarian assistance (Dugard, 2001: 408).
There is also no division of labour among conflict management agencies (Van
Nieuwkerk, 2001: 4). Kofi Annan suggests that in order for the UN and the
Security Council to maintain their credibility with consistent peacekeeping and
humanitarian assistance, it is essential to form a partnership with Africa. (Annan,
2000: 3-4). This would mean point to an association with the OAU/AU, regional
and sub-regional organisations, civil society and individuals.
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3.1.3 UN Involvement in Southern Africa: Shared Responsibility
The United Nations has launched more peacekeeping operations in Africa,
despite the absence of such references in the Charter, than in any other single
region (Neethling, 1999: 27). In spite of growing political unwillingness and
financial constraints (Vogt, 1999: 52), of the thirty peacekeeping operations
established by the UN since 1988, fourteen, or nearly half, have been in Africa
(Clapham, 1999: 25). Several operations, such as the ones in Angola,
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia and the ORC, have constituted
important initiatives in peacekeeping and conflict resolution (Clapham, 1999: 25).
However, not all of these initiatives met with success. While Namibia and
Mozambique were regarded as successes for the UN, Angola, Rwanda and
Somalia were dismal failures. The outcome in the ORC is still uncertain, but
progress in being made due to the latest South African initiative.
The many unresolved conflicts in Africa far outweighed the UN's successes, and
highlight the organisation's weakness in areas such as diplomatic arbitration,
peacekeeping and peace-enforcing (Neethling, 1999: 27). The UN is fragile and
has become over-burdened with greater responsibilities, while constantly
struggling with acute financial constraints, as well as the lack of political will
(Cilliers, 1999: 150).
The UN should co-operate more effectively with African continental role-players
to make peacekeeping operations more successful. The case of ECOMOG
(Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) in Liberia is a
good example of co-operation between the UN and a sub-regional organisation,
that could form positive foundations for the future (Neethling, 1999: 42) and
should be considered by Southern Africa.
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The UN now seems prepared to form partnerships with regional organisations,
and Africa is, in fact, the first continent where extensive efforts have been made
between the UN and the OAU to enhance the management of conflict (Annan,
2000: 4).
It is widely accepted that peacekeeping is essentially a UN responsibility, and
any efforts made by regional organisations should conform to rules set out in the
UN Charter (Neethling, 1999:41). Yet regional organisations, whether, political or
economic, are obliged to play an active role in regional security (Neethling, 1999:
38). The concept of shared responsibility and a layered response system is
considered to be the only way forward in achieving effective conflict management
(Malan, 2000: 170-171).
As mentioned, apart from Namibia, the UN's mission in Mozambique was a
success, and the organisation succeeded in bringing the Mozambican peace
process to a conclusion by facilitating elections (Aldrich, 2000: 3-4). Among the
contributing factors, as identified by Aldrich (2000: 4), two are of particular
importance, namely: the confidence of the Mozambican people and government,
and the support of the international community who contributed personnel. A
willingness by international, regional and national actors to co-operate, and share
responsibility, contributed to lasting peace.
Shared responsibility should not only refer to ground operations, but also to
decision-making as well, particularly at the higher levels of the UN structure. The
restructuring of the Security Council to achieve a fairer representation of
developing states, would facilitate greater shared responsibility. It is an issue that
is, however, not willingly broached by the present members of the Security
Council, but one that is necessary for the UN to assert its moral authority
(Mulikita, 2002: 36) and gain credibility in the eyes of the world.
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The Security Council's reluctance to commitment to future peacekeeping
operations in Africa (Vogt, 1999: 52), seemingly as a result of financial
constraints and a desire to protect their soldiers from unnecessary aggression, is
not evident in other areas of the world. Certain Western powers have lacked
neither resources nor will, to commit to military involvement in Iraq, for example,
in order to secure national oil interests (Mulikita, 2002: 36). Considering that two-
thirds of the total UN membership are made up of countries from the developing
world (Field, 1998: 1), the UN and its Security Council should think seriously
about possible reform to become more representative, and perhaps ultimately
more successful.
Mulikita (2002: 36) states that there is a persistent suspicion that the UN is not
substantially concerned with addressing peace and security challenges in Africa.
The official position of the OAU on the reform of the Security Council, is that the
present Council is not numerically proportionate to the distribution of General
Assembly membership, and that the Council has become an instrument to further
the policy interests of the world's remaining superpower, the United States.
At this stage, it is worth mentioning the Brahimi Report, which reviews the UN's
peace operations, not only in respect of peace-keeping but also preventative
action and post-conflict peace-building. Landsberg (2001: 3-4) writes that the
many UN failures, particularly in Africa, led to a serious loss of confidence in UN
intervention. The Report is aimed at improving efficiency of UN peace operations
and restoring confidence in them.
During a workshop debating the Brahimi Report, two broad views were
expressed (Landsberg, 2001: 3). The first, is that the UN should remain
responsible for preserving global peace and security, but with a joint African-
inspired effort. The second, is that Africa needs to show its own will and capacity
to maintain peace, mainly due to the lack of political interest from western
powers.
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Africa is, however, not equipped to completely disregard UN intervention, and
even such a suggestion is not grounded on sound statistics. A division of labour
between the UN and sub-regional organisations, as mentioned earlier, would be
a better option. The Brahimi Report, however, gives little attention as to the UN's
need to engage with sub-regional organisations, which points to a serious
omission (Landsberg, 2001: 4).
3. 1.4 UN, Regionalism and Security
The United Nations is still functioning very much according to the ideals of old
regionalism and old security. The organisation was state-initiated, and remains
state-based. It is therefore dominated by a state-centric approach, which has
become obsolete, particularly in the developing world where threats to security
are not limited to threats to sovereignty alone.
As previously mentioned, there has been no amendment of the functioning of the
UN since its inception. Therefore, there is little chance of the organisation being
suited to tackle threats to new security, especially since these new threats do not
advocate the state as the primary referent of security. According to the UN,
threats of security are is still mainly those that threaten the sovereignty of
members states.
The Security Council is made up of 15 member states, who will logically put their
national interests ahead of the interests of other states, despite the
consequences that their decisions may have on humanity as a whole. Also, the
Security Council can be described as "Western driven" (Neethling, 2000: 39-40).
Decision-making in the UN does not include civil society, non-governmental
organisations, or the business sector, which again points to a state-centric, and
therefore, old regionalism and conventional security approach. There is no doubt
that although restructuring, effecting the process of decision-making, would be an
immense undertaking and definitely long term, it has to be considered if the
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organisation is to be accountable to the circumstances of the present global
structure. UN peace-building efforts, at least, should involve civil society
organisations and local communities (Landsberg, 2001: 4).
States should not be seen as the 'guardians' of a global security system, since as
established in the Chapter 2, they have themselves been sources of insecurity,
particularly in Southern Africa.
There is no sign that circumstances are changing regarding the state-centric
attitude of UN members. In fact, events point in completely the opposite direction,
where particularly powerful states are reluctant to act in matters that have no
direct national concern for them. The problem with a state-centric disposition is
that it is ultimately a hindrance to the UN's primary goal of the maintenance of
international peace and security.
If the UN maintains old regionalism and conventional security practices, it sets
the standard for the rest of the world. Also, if this global organisation, to who's
principles all regional security organisations must adhere, is entirely state-based
and even worse state-centric, how can regional organisations be expected to
institute, let alone abide by the rules of a broader human security?
3.2 The Southern African Development Community
3.2. 1 Background
The formation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was the
culmination of a long process, through which the leaders of southern African
countries wished to combine resources in order to achieve collective self-reliance
(SADC Background, 2002: 1). The relatively small sizes of African economies,
saw southern African countries wanting and hoping to achieve faster growth,
sustainable development, political stability, and improved welfare in the region,
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through an integration of their markets (Ramsamy, 2001: 33). SADC was
formerly the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC),
which was established in April 1980 to harmonise economic development in
southernAfrica, but at the same reduce economic dependence on South Africa.
The Declaration Treaty establishing SADC was signed in Windhoek, Namibia in
August 1992, and laid down objectives that would:
• achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the
standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the
socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
• evolve common political values, systems and institutions;
• promote and defend peace and security;
• promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance,
and the inter-dependence of Member States;
• achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and
programmes;
• promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of the
resources of the Region;
• achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of
the environment; and
• strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural
affinities and links among the peoples of the Region (SADC Background,
2002: 2).
After South Africa's first fully democratic election, the country became the
eleventh member of the SADC group in 1994. Mauritius was admitted in 1995,
followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Seychelles in 1997,
which constituted the final three to make up the fourteen-strong arrangement
(SADC Background, 2002: 1).
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The members of SADC are thus: Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (SADC Background, 2002: 1).
SADC was to move beyond SADCC's approach of market integration through
project co-ordination, towards a development integration approach in order to
address existing inequalities within the region (Meyns, 2002: 62). Such an
approach would, however, demand a strengthening of regional institutions
(Meyns, 2002: 63-64). National institutions, in the form of Sector Co-ordinating
Units (SCU), serving regional goals were, however, not abolished (Meyns, 2002:
64).
Thus, the emphasis from 1992 to 2002 remained on decentralised sectoral
development in the implementation of regional policies, projects and programmes
(Ramsamy, 2001: 35). Since 1992, some progress in regional governance was
made with the establishment of the SADC Free Trade Area, but with national
sovereignty at stake, compromises were hard to come by (Meyns, 2002: 77).
The challenge for SADC, is to establish clear goals and strategies that will guide
the process of economic integration, remains. It will ultimately become necessary
to develop consensus among member states and to mobilise the technical
capacity required for deeper regional integration (Ramsamy, 2001: 36).
At this point it is worth mentioning the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 and the
Abuja Treaty of 1991, which created a vision of market integration continentally.
The plans proposed regional markets that would combine and form African
markets on the analogy of the European model.
The Abuja Treaty was an important strategy for Africa, since it established the
African Economic Community (AEC), which would be set up through a process of
co-ordination and progressive integration of the existing and future regional
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3.2.2 Formation of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: 1996 - 1997
economic communities (REC) in Africa. These REC's, of which SADC constituted
an existing example, were considered the building blocks of the AEC
(ConstitutiveAct of the African Union, 2001: 3).
Although the primary objectives of SADC centre around economic and social
aspects, "politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security" are
listed by the SADC Treaty as one of the major areas of co-operation (Meyns,
2002: 69) . De Coning (1997: 12) affirms that most regional organisations, such
as SADC, evolved as economic blocs, and had to consider security because it
constituted a stumbling block for development.
In July 1994, SADC held a Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security in
Windhoek, in an attempt to broaden SADC's statute to incorporate political and
security concerns (Van Aardt, 1997: 146). At the Gaborone Summit of 1994, the
Heads of States and Government issued a document that detailed the
institutional structure of "a new sector for Political Co-operation, Democracy,
Peace and Security" (Van Aardt, 1997: 146). Two more years of meetings and
deliberations, resulted in the founding of the Organ on Politics, Defence and
Security (OPDS) (Van Aardt, 1997: 147).
The subsequent launching of the Organ in June 1996, was executed with the
intentions of addressing conflicts through a new security approach (Breytenbach,
2000: 85), where matters of security included socio-economic, political,
ecological and military dimensions (Meyns, 2002: 69). Through the establishment
of the Organ, to function as part of SADC, security was integrated into existing
structures (Meyns, 2002: 70).
The establishment of the Organ, was also seen as a means to address the
shortcomings of the SADC summit. The SADC Treaty declares, that the Council
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of Ministers, responsible for the functioning and development of SADC and
subsequent implementation of policies, is empowered by ministers of economic
planning and finance (Brammer, 1999: 21-22). This meant that, unlike the
majority of other regional organisations, there was no official forum within the
SADC structures for foreign ministers to meet and discuss matters of a regional
nature, concerned with promoting and defending regional peace and stability
(Brammer, 1999: 1).
The SADC communiqué released on the 26th of June 1996 presented a variety
of detailed objectives that demonstrated the way in which the Organ on Politics,
Defence and Security would operate (Breytenbach, 2000: 86).
The founding of the Organ saw the start of SADC moving away from its
decentralised sectors approach. There were doubts about dealing with sensitive
security issues at the technical level of a Sector Co-ordinating Unit and handing it
to a single member (Meyns, 2002: 70). The result was the forming of the Organ
that would "operate at the summit, ministerial and technical level, independently
of other SADC structures, [and] the chairmanship of the Organ shall rotate on an
annual and a troika basis" (Brammer, 1999: 1). The troika arrangement meant
that the current, immediate past and next chairs, would deliberate on issues
pertaining to the operation of the Organ, as well as decisions related to security
(VanAardt, 1997: 152).
The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which had been
established at an earlier time, within the former Front Line States (FLS), met
annually to discuss security concerns in three sub-committees of SADC, namely:
State, Security, Defence and Public Security (Mills, 1994: 8). It became one of
the institutions of the Organ on Politics, Security and Defence, acting as an ad
hoc secretariat (Tsie, 1998: 1). At the suggestion of the Windhoek Workshop, the
Association of Southern African States (ASAS), which replaced the FLS, was
also incorporated into the new structure (Van Aardt, 1997: 146-147).
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3.2.3 Suspension of the Organ: 1997 - 2001
While the SADC Chairperson at that time was President Nelson Mandela of
South Africa, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe became the first
Chairperson of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (Meyns, 2002: 70).
Despite the laborious process that led to the formation of the Organ on Politics,
Defence and Security, by September 1997, barely 15 months after its inception,
the Organ had been suspended (Breytenbach, 2000: 85). Several factors can
account for the failure of the Organ.
An initial consideration is whether regional economic or development
communities can be expected to succeed in their collaborative duties in the
security realm. Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 9-10) maintains that such an
assumption should not be made, and that judging from the experiences of SADC,
regional economic arrangements may not be adequately designed to address
security threats. "Peace through mutually beneficial co-operation is not
inevitable".
Malan (1999: 10) makes a similar point by stating that most sub-regional
organisations originated as a result of a need for economic co-operation, and
have only recently been expected to address issues of security co-operation and
conflict management. This, according to him, has lead to a poor fit between roles
and structures, evident in SADC's inability to operationalise its Organ, and the
lack of institutionalised crisis prevention and management mechanisms (Malan,
1999: 3-10).
Another primary problem, contributing to the suspension of the Organ, was the
vague communique on the institutional framework (Brammer, 1999: 1). This
vagueness led to fundamental differences in interpretation of the operational
functioning, and certain member states regarded the Organ as being responsible
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This in turn led to another set of problems concerning with early warning system.
Because of the preventative diplomacy and disaster relief approach that SADC
agreed upon for the Organ, it would have made sense to develop and determine
the exact nature of a regional early warning system. This, however, was not done
rendering the Organ useless in instituting the new security thinking (Van Aardt,
1997: 154).
to the SADC Summit, while others thought the Organ to be independent
(Brammer, 1999: 1). Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, interpreted the
communique as meaning that the SADC Organ would operate autonomously, as
the FLS had in the past; while President Nesion Mandela, insisted that the
intention had always been for the Organ to be an integral part of SADC (Meyns,
2002: 70).
Van Aardt (1997: 151-158) identifies difficulties experienced by the Organ, that
occurred due to a lack of structure and direction. Although the Organ placed
heavy emphasis on political and diplomatic mechanisms for obtaining peace and
security in the region, these mechanisms were least developed in terms of
practical implementation and institutional structure, which lead to an informal,
reactive response dealing with situations only after they became crises.
Communication on all levels was poorly developed. Not only was there no clearly
defined relationship with the OAU and UN, but the links between states were just
as weak (Van Aardt, 1997: 153). Also, the lack of connection and formal
interaction between the social and economic sectors of SADC, and the political
and security sectors of the Organ was formidable, except at the Heads of States
level which was located at the summit (van Aardt, 1997: 155-156). References to
civil participation was unspecific in the Gaborone document of 1994, and
therefore no formal interaction existed between the Organ and civil society (Van
Aardt, 1997: 156-157).
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Despite the organisation's declaration to "promote the political, economic, social
and environmental dimensions of security" and to "encourage popular
participation in its decision-making processes", Tsie (1998: 1) states that the new
security paradigm had little impact on the approach of SADC to regional security
problems. Breytenbach (2000: 88) highlights Goncalves' thoughts, who wrote that
he did not believe that the SADC regional security arrangement would survive,
because to him the intentions were too militaristic.
Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 89-91) makes the point that SADC's OPDS failed as a
result of the suffocating influence of arrogant state elites, and asserts that elites
don't want to see a powerful OPDS, so as to protect national interests and
advance their own agendas. Hansohm and Peters-Berries (2002: 118) maintain
that SADC has, for most of its existence, been "the club of the Heads of State",
and that its constitution and structure has allowed for limited participation from
non-governmental organisations.
SADC seems to have realised, that the active participation of private business,
social, environmental, cultural and other non-state groups, is the only way to
make SADC and its various structures function successful, but it will take a
concerted effort to fully include civil society in proceedings (Hansohm & Peters-
Berries, 2002: 118).
Furthermore, member states have remained reluctant to accept encroachments
on their national sovereignty. The fact that SADC was more an inter-government
arrangement rather than a supranational body, accounted for its very weakness
(Solomon & Cilliers, 1996: 24). This was especially apparent during the SADC
intervention of 1998 (De Coning, 2000: 39). King Letsie III dismissed the
democratically elected Prime Minister, and in a bid to restore democracy, South
Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe coerced Letsie III to set down in favour of his
son, and to reinstate the Prime Minister.
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The dilemma lies in the fact that, although it was argued by the South African
government that the missionwas undertaken under a 1996 SADC decision, there
was no explicit decision that SADC should intervene militarily (De Coning, 2000:
42). It now appears that the decision to intervene was taken at a meeting of
defence ministers in Gaberone on 15 September 1998, but only South Africa and
Botswana were present (De Coning, 2000: 43). The South African government
was accused of initiating the intervention in order to safeguard their in the Katse
Damwater scheme (Neethling, 2000: 141).
The attitude of the supremacy of sovereignty and national interests was,
however, altered during the meeting in Maputo in 1999 (Meyns, 2002: 77). The
turning point came when SADC leaders attempted to resolve the deadlock
surrounding the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, and overcoming this
deadlock provided the pretext to tackle the reform of all SADC institutions
(Meyns, 2002: 77).
Reviewing SADC institutions ultimately led to a replacing of the system of
decentralised sector co-ordinating units, with four Directorates at the SADC
Headquarters (Meyns, 2002: 76). This decision taken at the Extraordinary
Summit held in Windhoek March 2001, can be seen as the culmination of a
process, initiated at the time of SADC's establishment in 1992, to strengthen
regional institutions (Meyns, 2002: 77).
3.2.4 The Windhoek Summit and the Blantyre Protocol of 2001
The institutional problems that were prevalent in SADC and its Organ, were not
ones that could be altered, and over the past two years SADC has undertaken to
restructure its institutions. At a meeting in Windhoek in March 2001, Heads of
State and Government adopted proposals for a major restructuring of the
organisation, "involving the phasing out of existing commissions and sectors and
the establishment of four directorates" (Meyns, 2002: 59).
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At this Extraordinary Summit held on 9 March, a "Report on the Review of the
Operations of SADC Institutions, including the Organ on Politics, Defence and
Security" was adopted (Meyns, 2002: 76-77). It stated that the Troika system
would be established for all policy organs, including the Organ on Politics,
Defence and Security (Meyns, 2002: 77). It was also stressed that the Organ on
Politics, Defence and Security would have a clear position within rather than
outside the SADC organisation (Hansohm & Peters-Berries, 2002: 109). The
report also paid attention to regional integration, the lack of synergy between
objectives and strategies, and regional resources.
Furthermore it was decided that the structure, operations and functions of the
Organ would be restructured, and regulated by the Protocol on Politics, Defence
and Security which was submitted to the regular SADC Summit in Blantyre in
August 2001 for approval and signature (SADC Background, 2002: 3).
The protocol provides that a plenary ministerial committee will operate below the
Organ, together with two additional ministerial-level committees, namely: the
ISDSC and a new politics and diplomacy ministerial committee (Berman, 2001:
55). The country that chairs the Organ will also chair the subsidiary structures,
and will also provide its secretatriat as an interim arrangement (Berman, 2001:
55).
At the Blantyre SADC Summit, Robert Mugabe was "eased out of the
chairpersonship of the SADC Organ" (Meyns, 2002: 78). He will continue to be a
member of the Troika leadership, with President Chissano of Mozambique as
chairperson, and Tanzania's President Mkapa as his deputy (Meyns, 2002: 78).
The Committee of Ministers for the Organ met from the 18th - 19th December
2001 to discuss conflicts in the region. The meeting, which was held in Luanda,
Angola, under the Chairpersonship of Hon. Dr Leonardo Santos Simao, Minister
of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the Republic of Mozambique. Throughout
52
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
their discussions about efforts in Angola, the ORC, Lesotho, Zambia and
Zimbabwe, it appeared that all were committed to working towards sustainable
peace and security (SAOC Communique, 2001: 1-4).
Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 90) writes that the SAOC Organ's ISOSC is promoting
regional confidence-building, through progress with co-operation in areas of
disaster management, satellite communications, peacekeeping training and
doctrine, and public security issues such as drug trafficking and firearm
smuggling. He also maintains that SAOC appears to be working well on the
technical levels of defence and security.
Apart from the changes in the structure of the Organ, progress has been made in
other spheres. SAOC ratified the trade protocol and put it into force on 1
September 2000, which together with its more centralised structure, indicate a
desire to expand regional integration (Hansohm & Peters-Berries, 2002: 109).
While progress was made at the Windhoek Summit, uneasiness around a
number of issues continues. Financing for the Organ's activities and its potential
future peace operations remains an uncertainty (Berman & Sams, 2001: 55).
Also the continuing war in the ORC, coupled with the political crises in Zambia
and Zimbabwe, are undermining economies and affecting growth (Hansohm &
Peters-Berries, 2002: 124-125).
3.2.5 SAOG, Regionalism and Security
Economic arrangements may not always be adequately equipped to deal with
security issues. Security structures cannot be instituted simply because a region
has an effective and competent economic arrangement, and successful
economic integration will not necessary lead to successful political integration.
Co-operative security bodies can only be established through consent, rather
than imposed by threat of force (Cilliers, 1999: 149).
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National self-interests continue to dominate over collective regional interests.
Most importantly, there appears to be little political and economic homogeneity in
SouthernAfrica, and according to Solomon and Cilliers (1996: 22-23), the region
does not constitute a security community, such as explained in chapter 2. The
region fails to exhibit common values or goals, which was obvious from the
varied interpretations of the SAOC communiqué establishing the OPOS, for
example. Regionness, or a regional identity, is important for a functioning
regional security structure, but regionness cannot be established without
common values, that could ultimately lead to regional co-operation or regional
integration.
SAOC planned to move towards development integration in order to address
inequalities in the region. Although some progress in regional government has
been made, with national sovereignty at stake, compromises were difficult to
reach (Meyns, 2002: 77). Gerrit Olivier (2001: 39) maintains that the lack of
success in regional initiatives in Southern Africa, should not be regarded as a
fault of the concept, but rather "an indictment against short-sighted politicians
and incompetent bureaucratswho never gave [these initiatives] a chance to work
properly".
Solomon and Cilliers (1996: 21-27) expressed doubts as to whether Southern
Africa even constituted a region. Their doubts, although expressed in 1996, are
still relevant. SAOC continues to display the characteristics of an inter-
governmental government, and advancement towards a transnational body is
slow indeed.
Regional co-operation remains important to advance regional security precisely
because co-operation follows from common regional views. A regional approach
to security, as already established, is necessary to address new threats to
security in Southern Africa. A broader security approach would have to be
attained through multiple dimensions, including the economic, political and social.
54
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Due to SADC's state-centric approach, a truly regional option for broader
regional and human security may not be impossible. From the Lesotho example
it is clear that SADC was not truly co-operating in terms of a regional agenda. It
is unacceptable that only two out of the 14 members of SADC, attended a
meeting that supposedly decided on the use of military force in the region (De
Coning, 2000: 43).
SADC failed to act according to the principles of new security. Although the
Organisation and its OPDS, advocated the principles of new security, based on
the Helsinki Accord, it failed to do so in practice. Principles for institution of new
security approaches were an important part of the communiqué establishing
OPOS, but this was only on paper and failed to transpire into the practical. This
will be elaborated on in the following chapter, using the ORCas a case study.
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4. 1. 1 Origins of the Conflict
Chapter 4:
Southern African Case Study: the Democratic Republic of the Congo
4.1 Assessment of the Conflict
Exploring the colonial origins of the crisis in the Congo is an attempt to
understand why the conflict prevails to this day, and why it has been so difficult to
resolve. These initial problems are important to consider because they are
continually adding fuel to present-day hostilities, that have serious internal and
regional dimensions (Sarkin, 2001: 67).
At the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, European colonial powers took to carving
Africa into colonies without consideration for settlement patterns or the people
residing in the region, resulting in extremely heterogenous societies (Sarkin,
2001: 67-68). The borders of the Congo were fixed and King Leopold II of
Belgium, who gained control of the area, plundered it for all its worth
(Breytenbach et al, 1999: 33-36). This plundering was condoned by other
powers, and the Belgian government assumed control in 1908 (Breytenbach et
al, 1999: 33-38).
Belgian control, and their subsequent development of a system which led to the
introduction of two separated legal systems, one civic and the other ethnic, laid
the foundations for a problem that is, to this day, fuelling the ORC conflict
(Sarkin, 2001: 68). Civil law was administered by the central state, while local
authorities enforced ethnic power through customary law (Sarkin, 2001: 68). The
result was a confusion and complexity of laws, that led to dual citizenship, which
gave some membership of the state, while others a membership of a native
authority. Although everyone was a citizen of the Congo since 1960, not
everyone had ethnic citizenship or land rights (Breytenbach et ai, 1999: 33-36).
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The Banyamulenge,which referred to Tutsis living in the Kivu province of Congo,
became a collective name given to all immigrants and refugees, none of whom
possessed all the rights, despite having settled in the Congo hundreds of years
before independence (Breytenbach et al, 1999: 33-36).
Another issue related to ethnicity, which again continues to be an immense
problem today, was one that played the two dominant ethnic group against one
another. Throughout the areas of the Congo and surrounding countries of
Rwanda and Burundi, the aristocratic Tutsi minority ruled over the Hutu majority
(Breytenbach et al, 1999: 34). As Sarkin (2001: 69) explains, ethnicity was not
initially a cause for conflict amongst the tribes, and the Tutsi and Hutu were more
or less on an equal footing and intermarriage was common. People could "shift"
from being in one tribe to being in another, depending on their economic status
(Sarkin, 2001: 69). Ethnicity became an issue when used by colonial powers for
strategic purposes, an example of which is the Belgian introduction of identity
cards that "emphasised a social hierarchy based on ethnicity" (Sarkin, 2001: 68-
69).
It is worth noting the situation in the region as a whole. Although Germany
colonised Rwanda and Burundi, the Belgians took over administration of the
regions in 1916 after VWJ I, with a mandate from the League of Nations (Sarkin,
2001: 69). While under German control, the situation remained stable and
peaceful, and the Germans used existing structures and operations to govern the
countries through a system of "indirect rule" (Sarkin, 2001: 69). It was Belgian
colonisers, with their system of "divide and rule", who began the formal
classification of Rwandans into racial categories in the 1930s (Sarkin, 2001: 69).
These methods of governing entrenched distinctions between the various ethnic
groups, and gave some groups more rights and privileges than others,
depending solely on racial differences (Sarkin, 2001: 70). Needless to say, it
furnished animosity between the groups that remains deeply ingrained, and has
resulted in gross violations of human rights and human dignity.
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4.1.2 Present Day Conflict
The Belgians continued their policies based on racial distinction until Congo's
independence. They managed to further aggravate the situation by initially
supporting the Tutsis, and later abandoning their support when the Tutsis began
demanding independence in the early 1950s (Sarkin, 2001: 70). The Hutus, as
the majority, were the newly favoured group and began excluding the Tutsis from
political, social and educational spheres, after having experienced oppression in
the Congo and its neighbouring countries, for the past 60 years (Sarkin : 2001:
70).
The conflict in the Congo has been one of the longest and most perplexing on
the continent, affecting the bulk of central and southern Africa (Cleaver &
Massey, 2001: 193). The ORC has experienced a turbulent civil war, two
rebellions and a name change, since 1960.
Congo gained independence in 1960 (Breytenbach et ai, 1999: 35) and general
elections were held in May of that year, with Patrice Lumumba from the
Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) forming the first national government and
becoming Prime Minister (Sarkin, 2001: 70).
After independence, the mineral rich province of Katanga declared itself
independent, and Lumumba requested the UN to intervene, shortly before being
killed at the beginning of 1961 (Sarkin, 2001: 70). Between the years of 1960 and
1963 the Congo was a UN protectorate, and after several years of strife, Mobutu
Sese Seko began his 32 year reign after a coup d'état in 1965 (Sarkin, 2001: 70).
Mobutu changed the name of the Congo to Zaire, but failed to introduce any
other significant reforms and ruled the country in a militaristic fashion with the
Belgian "divide and rule" technique (Sarkin, 2001: 70). In 1981, he passed the
Citizenship Law, which once again certified those without ancestors born before
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1885 in the Congo region, as civic citizens only, without the access to social and
economic rights, in spite of the fact that some had been there for generation
(Breytenbach et al, 1999: 33-36).
It deprived the Banyamulenge of South Kivu, and the Banyarwanda, a Rwandan-
speaking population composed of Hutus and Tutsis in North Kivu, of their
citizenship (Sarkin, 2001: 70). Coupled with food shortages and high population
growths, the legislation saw the start of tribal clashes in the eastern province of
Kivu in 1993 (Sarkin, 2001: 70).
Native authorities in the Kivu provinces created their own military, known as the
Mai-Mai, which was encouraged and supported by the Zairian military to attack
communities, displacing thousands of civilians (Sarkin, 2001: 71). The first
rebellion had started, and lasted from 1993 until 1997, during which Mobutu
collaborated with the former Rwandan Armed Forces known as ex-FAR, and
helped them to rearm (Sarkin, 2001: 71). He also formed an alliance with the
Hutu regime in Rwanda (Sarkin, 2001: 71). Between the start of the rebellion and
1996, hundreds of Tutsis were massacred, and in October of 1996, the Deputy
Director of South Kivu Province stated that 300 000 Banyamulenge had to leave
Zaire for Rwanda or they would be killed (Sarkin, 2001: 71).
Subsequently the Banyamulenge retaliated and their uprising was joined by
Laurent Kabila and his Alliance de Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du
Congo-Zaire (ADFL) (Sarkin, 2001: 71). The anti-Mobutu struggle was also
externally supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, who came to the aid of
the Banyamulenge. They recognised that a chance of victory would rid them of
Mobutu. (Breytenbach et ai, 1999: 38-39). Both countries felt threatened by
guerrilla forces acting against them in Zairian territory, and Mobutu had done
precious little to control guerrilla activity and was, in fact, known to encourage it
(Tsie, 1998: 9).
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The external parties realised that in overthrowing Mobutu, they would have to
find a replacement that would be recognised by the entire Zairian populace.
Thus, in 1997 Laurent Kabila became president, of the newly named Democratic
Republic of Congo (Sarkin, 2001: 71).
At that time, Kabila had a strong alliance with the Tutsi, but this association did
not last long. In the hope of forming a new and more useful alliance with the
Congolese population, Kabila began excluding the Banyamulenge and Tutsi from
power, which he hoped would gain the formers' approval because of their
continued hatred for the Banyamulenge (Breytenbach et al, 1999: 39). August
the 3rd, 1998 saw the start of the second rebellion, which although again fueled
by Banyamulenge insecurities was aimed at ousting Kabila (Breytenbach et ai,
1999:40).
Kabila had made several serious mistakes in his short term as president, one of
them was the failure to maintain an alliance with his former allies, by being
unwilling to assist them in improving their domestic matters (Tsie, 1998: 9). The
other was the refusal to establish a legitimate democracy (Tsie, 1998: 9), and the
alienation of the international community through a canceling of mining
concessions with western multinationals (Naidoo, 2001: 18). International
observers concluded that the second rebellion, although not officially supported
by external parties, saw planning and execution directed by Rwanda, with
Uganda and Burundi helping to remove Kabila from power (Tsie, 1998: 9). The
second rebellion lasted from 1997 to 2001, and despite being shorter attracted
more external intervention. Uganda, Chad and the Sudan all contributed to the
conflict in the Congo, while certain members of SADC, namely Angola, Namibia
and Zimbabwe acted unilaterally, in support of Kabila and his government.
Laurent Kabila continued his reign of power until his assassination on 16 January
2001 (Naidoo, 2001: 18). Joseph Kabila, the 29 year old son of the former
president, took over in a "swift and monarchial appointment" (Naidoo, 2001: 18).
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4.1.3 The ORC Conflict in Review
Kabila Jnr introduced economic reforms and renewed severed ties with the
international community (Naidoo, 2001: 18-19). It remains to be seen whether he
will be able to institute political reforms successfully. State building, including the
creation of institutions for proper governance, should be initiate as soon as
possible.
The ORCconflict has been fuelled by violence and animosity, based on ethnicity.
This occurred as a result of the two legal systems, as instituted by the Belgian
colonisers, and the accentuation of ethnicity, by the power, in order to maintain
authority. Ethnic injustice continues to be a threat to the people of the ORC, and
protection of minorities is still not guaranteed under the new constitution.
Further conflict-related threats to the people of the ORC come in the form of civil
unrest and military coups, and the ongoing weakness of the state through,
amongst other reasons, a general failure to establish a legitimate democracy.
Under Mobutu, the Congolese state collapsed, as a result of corruption,
mismanagement and manipulation of power (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2001: 44-46).
Although President Kabila introduced economic reforms at the beginning of his
reign, sound political reforms are yet to be instituted. Political and economic
instability remains prevalent.
Threats to the ORC state, in the form of external aggression, also characterise
the conflict. Foreign invasions and military threats from surrounding states,
including Uganda, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola,
have all placed the sovereignty of the ORC at risk. Rwanda, Uganda and
Burundi, for example, have annexed vast parts of the Congo, and have been
systematically pillaging the natural resources of the country (Nzongola-Ntalaja,
2001:46).
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Liongo (1999: 12-13) writes, that the Congolese people are convinced that the
real reason why Rwandan and Ugandan troops are fighting each other in
Kinsangani is to secure access to the area's mineral resources. The continuation
of the war is blamed on outside forces.
The consequences of the conflict have also resulted in threats for the entire
Great Lakes region, and in fact Southern Africa. Repercussions, such as the loss
of investor confidence due to the ongoing conflict, is an issue for the whole
region. Furthermore the exodus of Congolese people into surrounding countries,
have caused economic, social and political problems in those countries.
The conflict in the Great Lakes region, is a war of resources, militaristic regimes,
territorial expansion and economic exploitation (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2001: 47). All
the threats to the population of the ORC and to the state itself, coupled with the
threats to the region that transcend the borders of the ORC, indicate that the
conflict exhibits attributes of conventional and new security threats. It, therefore,
demands the need for a broader approach to security. The security approach
would have to address the conventional, as well as the new threats, and would,
therefore, require a multidimensional and regional focus.
Furthermore, the conflict is distinguished by internal and regional dimensions. A
national solution would not be possible for this regional conflict, in the same way
that a regional solution would not suffice for the internal hostilities. There cannot
be peace in the Congo if there are no institutions to guarantee the security of
neighbouring states (Liongo, 1999: 13). The success of a peaceful outcome in
the ORC depends on the co-operation and compliance of all the parties to the
conflict (Neethling, 2000: 40), internal and external. In other words a regional
stance and effort, is a necessity for a viable solution for the conflict.
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4.2.1 UN Missions in the ORe
4.2 UN Involvement
The United Nations has been engaged in the DRC conflict for a lengthy period of
time. The Organisation was first involved in 1960, when the Congo was under the
mandate of the UN (Sarkin, 2001: 70). The UN Security Council established the
UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Congo (ONUC), to ensure the withdrawal of all
Belgian and foreign forces, and to assist the government to maintain law and
order (Sibanda, 2000: 95-96). The mandate was further modified to include the
prevention of civil war, and the mission lasted from June 1960 to June 1964
(Sibanda, 2000: 95-96). The UN's involvement in the 1960s, together with its
present operation, indicate the only instance of repeated UN engagement in a
single country (Morjane, 2001: 86).
In November 1996, the Security Council concluded that the situation in the
eastern part of the country was deteriorating and constituted a threat to
international peace and stability (Friman, 2001: 67). This was again reiterated in
April 1999. MONUC (United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic
Republic of Congo) was established at the request of the belligerents, as outlined
in the Lusaka Agreement (Morjane, 2001: 86). In August 1999, the Security
Council authorised the deployment of up to 90 UN military liaison officers (MLO)
to the capitals of the parties to the agreement, with the aim of establishing and
maintaining contacts with all the parties involved in the agreement, and providing
assistance (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 34). This was to be known as the first phase
of MONUC (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 34).
Lusaka signatories, however, were hopeful that the UN would playa role in
peace enforcement, but MONUC was not provided with such responsibilities, and
its main objective was rather to observe the implementation of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement, through the monitoring of the progress made by the
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belligerents in this regard (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 5). MONUC was to be
implemented in three phases, with the phase I and phase " focusing on "the
cessation of hostilities and the disengagement/redeployment of the parties'
armed forces in the ORC" (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 5).
The importance of the first phase was that it was to provide valuable information
to the Secretary-General regarding the situation in the ORC. As it became
apparent that the signatories of the Lusaka Agreement were not respecting the
ceasefire and countless violations took place, the ability of the MLO to provide
accurate information for further UN deployment became seriously limited (Cilliers
& Malan, 2001: 35). Also, the mission was ineffectively deployed and was
prevented from carrying out its mandate (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 35).
In November 1999, the Security Council expanded the mandate of MONUC to
include a civilian police component and an integrated civil-military section to co-
ordinate operations relating to disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation and
reintegration, as well as an expanded civilian component to deal with the
monitoring of human rights (Friman, 2001: 67).
Lack of precise information effected the planning of the second phase of
MONUC. Also continued violations of the ceasefire prevented the full deployment
of MONUC. Parties to the agreement, however, saw UN involvement as the
solution to such violations and called for a "fully-fledged UN peacekeeping
mission without any further delay" (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 35).
In January 2000 the Secretary-General urged the expansion of MONUC from the
existing 77 MLOs to 5 537 military observers and peacekeepers, stating that due
to the insecurity and difficult terrain, the deployment of 500 observers and civilian
staff, in line with phase " of MONUC, would not be possible (Cilliers & Malan,
2001: 37). By June 2001, the UN had deployed a total of 2 366 military
personnel, including 497 liaison officers and military observers (Cilliers & Malan,
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2001: 43). A further 17 UN Officers provided planning support to the JMC in
Lusaka, and on 15 March 2001, 280 military observers were deployed (Cilliers &
Malan, 2001: 44).
MONUC felt that the commitment on all sides to redeployment was fairly firm, but
by 8 June 2001, only Uganda and Angola had provided information regarding
their forces (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 45). Unless all parties upheld the Lusaka
Agreement, conditions for the deployment of MONUC phase III would not be
possible (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 47). Malan and Boshoff (2002: 5) state, that the
success of the whole peacekeeing process has hinged on the degree to which
warring factions can be effectively disarmed, which historically has been one of
the most difficult tasks to implement.
By April 2001, MONUC was planning a third phase that would introduce a
process to "disarm, demobilise, repatriate, reintegrate all armed forces in the
ORC; hand over mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other
war criminals; and disarm all Congolese civilians who were illegally armed"
(Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 5). On 15 June, however, the Security Council extended
the mandate of MONUC until15 June 2002 (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 51). MONUC
thus envisaged that phase III would be executed over the period June 2002 to
June 2003, in three stages (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 5).
Malan and Boshoff (2002: 5-6) explain the three stages of MONUC phase III.
Stage 1 of phase III will be concerned with transitional operations in which
conditions for disarming, demobilising, repatriating, resettling, and reintegrating
will be created. This will include gathering information, building confidence, and
create conditions for voluntary disarmament and demobilisation. Stage 2 will
focus on repatriation and resettlement which are to be facilitated by political and
civilian actors, while military forces continue to disarm and demobilise. Although
it is too early to predict the scope and scale of stage 3, it will concern subsequent
operations.
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To execute phase III MONUC will require four task forces in order to establish 16
disarmament camps and manage the disarmament and demobilisation process
(Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 6). A force of 400 is in place in Kindu but the forward
staging base in not likely to be completed before the end of October 2002. Phase
III of the mission's deployment remained delayed and on 14 June 2002 the
Security Council called on UN member states to contribute resources to allow
MONUC to achieve its authorised strength (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 7).
More recently the UN sent a special envoy to the Great Lakes region, in an effort
to contribute to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Cornwell, 2002: 41). This special
envoy, led by Jean-David Levitte met with the governments of the DRC, Rwanda,
Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, as well as with rebel groups in the
Congo and the facilitator of the Dialogue (Cornwell, 2002: 41). Levitte reported
that the establishment of a transitional government was crucial, and that
disarmament of rebel groups and withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese
soil should follow immediately (Cornwell, 2002: 42).
For MONUC to be successful, it needs to adapt to the constantly changing
situations in the DRC and surrounds (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 74). It should also
be based on a comprehensive peace agreement (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 75),
which means that despite current MONUC involvement, parties to the conflict
should do their utmost to find and sustain an understanding, albeit national
sacrifices need to be made.
4.2.2 Assessing the UN Approach
The logic behind MONUC has not been to deploy a robust force capable of
conducting a peace enforcement operation. This, according to Neethling (2000:
39-40) points to a trend of waning UN involvement in complex emergencies that
may require the use of force. Peacekeeping operations in Africa have absorbed
an enormous amount of UN resources and energy, but have brought little in
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return. Western countries are unwilling to become directly involved on the
continent. This indicates that that the broader approach to security does not have
the attention it deserves, and that national interests and national security remain
dominant.
Furthermore, Africa is not a top priority for the US (Neethling, 2000: 39), and
although the USA is not the UN's only influential player, their attitude is important
to note considering that the country is the world's only superpower. It is worth
mentioning the African Crisis Response Forcellnitiative (ACRFII), which was an
initiative led by the Americans to address the conflict in the ORC. The failure of
the initiative, can be attributed to the unilateral approach instituted by the USA.
African leaders did not want such a strong unilateral influence from the
superpower.
The ideal situation in addressing and resolving conflict, would be a partnership
between the UN, and the OAU/AU, regional and sub-regional organisations and
civil society (Neethling, 2000: 40). In this way, all the stake-holders would be
guaranteed representation, and initiatives would not be solely state-led or
dominated by national interests.
MONUC is a complex and elaborate mission, which needs the combined support
of the region and the international community. For a successful implementation
of the MONUC mandate, a climate of co-operation in the region is an essential
pre-requisite (Neethling, 2000: 39).
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4.3.1 Unilateral Involvement of SAOG Members States
4.3 Involvement of SADC
The instability in the DRC was a clear indicator that the region needed to
establish a regional mechanism that would deal with political issues in the region
(Brammer, 1999: 1). Because the DRC was a SADC member, the Organ for
Politics, Defence and Security was entitled to fill that role.
The DRC became a member of SADC in August 1997, which meant that
although SADC had no mandate or responsibility to assist at the start of the first
rebellion in 1993, the Organisation did have an obligation to assist at the time of
the second rebellion, in terms of the protocol that established the Organ on
Politics, Defence and Security (Tsie, 1998: 9). But by September 1997, the
Organ had been suspended (Breytenbach, 2000: 85) due to various structural
and functional problems, and fundamental differences in interpretation of the
operational functioning (Brammer, 1999: 1).
Besides the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security being unable to assist in the
DRC conflict, SADC did not fare any better. On 23 August 1998, an emergency
meeting of SADC leaders was convened, and a decision was reached to confirm
recognition of the legitimacy of the government of the DRC and call for an
immediate ceasefire (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 3). Although President Nelson
Mandela was to organise a ceasefire, the following month at the 18th SADC
Summit, Zambian President Frederick Chiluba was appointed to lead mediation
efforts (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 3). Apart from this initiative, the organisation did
not establish a unified declaration concerning the conflict, which led to the
various member states engaging themselves on different sides. As a result the
war became thoroughly internationalised (Geldenhuys, 2000: 44).
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Kabila's government received unilateral military backing from SAOC members,
namely Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, all of which sent troops to the ORC
(Geldenhuys, 2000: 44).
For Kabila, Angola's intervention was valuable because of the influx of well-
trained and experienced troops from the Forcas Armadas Angolanas (FAA), as
well as the support of Angolan air power (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 205). The
Angolan government maintained that their involvement was to back Kabila's
legitimate government against a foreign invasion (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 205).
Another motivation, however, points to military intervention in the ORC to
promote the interests of the Angolan government. Although Rwanda, Uganda
and Angola had been allies during the rebellion of 1993, the Angolan government
wanted to prevent the Uniao Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola
(UNITA), the Angolan rebel movement, from reconstructing supply lines in south-
west ORC. The Angolan government needed to find an pretext to fight its own
rebels on Congo territory. This pretext came when the rebel alliance in the ORC,
supported by Rwanda and Uganda, accepted UNITA assistance, and gave the
Angolan government an excuse to intervene (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 205).
Despite not sharing a common border, Namibia sent troops to the ORC in August
1998, in order to preserve peace and stability in the region and affirmed that
African states should assist each other in striving for solidarity (Cleaver &
Massey, 2001: 202-203). Aside from these valiant reasons, President Njoma's
family, held stakes in the diamond operations in the ORC (Cleaver & Massey,
2001: 203). Involvement for Namibia proved costly (Cleaver & Massey, 203:
204).
Zimbabwe's involvement has been extensive and Robert Mugabe's regime and
his country have suffered tremendously as a result. The war has cost Zimbabwe
millions of dollars (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 197-198) and has weakened the
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4.3.2 Assessing the SAOG Approach
country economically and politically. It is readily believed that Zimbabwean
involvement has been for the benefit of the political elite, namely Mugabe and the
Zimbabwean Defence Force, who undertook the exploitation of minerals and the
rendering of protection to DRC forces in the garrison town of Mbandaka (Cleaver
& Massey, 2001: 197).
De Coning (1998: 20) indicates that the primary elements of both peacekeeping
and peace enforcement are neutrality and impartiality, and uses these factors to
reiterate that SADC military intervention in the DRC was illegitimate and illegal
since Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwian troops entered the war on one side of
the parties involved.
Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe legitimised their military involvement by alluding
to the flawed justifications of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security
and ISDSC decisions (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 205). Initially the combined
involvement was supposedly based on a decision of SADC's Organ, where
during a meeting it was proposed that the Organ become involved (Cleaver &
Massey, 2001: 196). But because the Organ was already suspended in 1997,
Mugabe despite being elected as the first Chairperson, had no capacity to speak
or act on behalf of the structure (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 196).
Similarly, it was stated that the intervention was authorised by a decision of the
ISDSC at an ad hoc meeting in Harare in August 1998 (Cleaver & Massey, 2001:
196). But as Cleaver and Massey maintain, the ISDSC "never claimed a mandate
for mutual defence intervention", which coupled with the fact that only four of the
fourteen members were present, undermined the legitimacy of the body (Cleaver
& Massey, 2001: 197).
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Under international law an intervention is legitimate "if duly authorised by the
international community" (De Coning, 1998: 21). In the case of SADC members
intervening in the DRC, there was a lack of authorisation by the international
community, which made the action illegitimate. Clear and transparent authorising
procedures should be instituted at both the OAU and SADC level, to leave no
ambiguity about when member states are authorised to intervene (De Coning,
1998: 22&31). SADC must also decide what kind of missions it is willing to
deploy (De Coning, 1998: 31) and clarify at what level decisions are to be taken
(De Coning, 1998: 22).
De Coning (1998: 21) reiterates, that although Zimbabwe argued that the DRC
was a victim of foreign aggression, their intervention was illegal for two reasons.
Firstly, no mutual defence agreement existed between the SADC countries, and
secondly, the rebellion in eastern DRC was far more than a simple act of foreign
invasion. Another argument used by Zimbabwe was that the rebel uprising was
an attempt to overthrow the legitimate government and had to be prevented (De
Coning, 1998: 22). Neither the OAU nor SADC have, however, formally adopted
any resolutions that would constitute intervention in situations of unconstitutional
changes of government (De Coning, 1998: 22).
Involvement of the members states was determined through individual national
policies, and there was no clear regional co-operation regarding intervention in
the DRC within the realm of SADC. SADC even failed to establish a unified
declaration regarding the conflict, which again indicated a lack of a concerted
regional effort.
This points explicitly to the dominance of a state-centric approach, as opposed to
a regional approach based on co-operation and integration, that should have
been utilised according to the mandate of SADC. Unilateral involvement from the
member states should not have been permitted without a mandate from a full-
house SADC Heads of State Meeting. Despite SADC's desire to integrate for the
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The state-centric approach was also evident in the members attitude towards a
security approach. Despite advocating principles of new security in the
communiqué establishing the SADC OPDS, the organisation failed to transfer the
human security doctrine into practice. This is evident from the fact that member
states acted in terms of their personal best economic interests, without granting
attention to human security threats in the region.
good of the region, the unilateral involvement indicates that perhaps Southern
African states were not ready to relinquish power, even for the good of the
region.
4.4 The Lusaka Peace Process. 1999 - 2002
Despite the unilateral intervention of SADC members, the inauguration of the
new South African president, Thabo Mbeki, in mid-1999, became a window of
opportunity, after the 18th SADC summit, to establish peace talks (Malan &
Boshoff, 2002: 3). Even though this initiative was not SADC-inspired, regional
leaders from Rwanda, Uganda, Libya and Kenya, as well as the 14 SADC
members, met in Pretoria on 17 June 1999 (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 3). This
meeting, showing a far greater commitment to regional co-operation, paved the
way for the DRC summit, which was to be held later in June for the purpose of
signing a ceasefire (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 3).
After three weeks of intensive negotiations, an agreement for a ceasefire in the
DRC, was signed in Lusaka on the 10th July 1999 (Masire, 2001: 1). Angola,
Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe all joined the DRC in signing the
Lusaka Agreement due to their direct involvement in the war, while Zambia, the
OAU, the UN and SADC signed as witnesses (Masire, 2001: 1). Several non-
state actors participated in a later signing of the Lusaka Agreement, such as
Congolese formations and Kivu-based militias, as well as non-Congolese groups
from Rwanda, Angola and Uganda (Wolpe, 2000: 27). The Accord was designed
...
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to bring about a formal end to the country's civil war, and provide the first
regionally authored and internationally sanctioned framework for the region's
political future (Wolpe, 2000: 28). The inclusion of non-state actors was a crucial
step in identifying all parties to the conflict, as opposed to solely state
participants.
Howard Wolpe, the US Special envoy to Africa's Great Lakes region, pointed out
three central causes of the Great Lakes crisis, namely: the absence of an
effectively functioning state authority, a continuing threat posed by non-state
rebel groups from the entire region, and unresolved conflicts in the countries
neighbouring the ORC (Wolpe, 2000: 28). In view of this the Lusaka Agreement
is meaningful in that it has attempted to address these very causes through a
regional initiative.
Geldenhuys (2000: 47) notes that because political factors were among those
that caused human suffering in the ORC, the machinery of the government
required reparation. The Lusaka Agreement laid the foundation for various
initiatives concerned with rehabilitating the ORC into a functioning state. The
peace agreement provides for the re-establishment of the state-administration
throughout the ORC, including a restructured national army (Geldenhuys, 2000:
47).
Also inter-Congolese negotiations, encompassing all the relevant political actors,
were envisaged by the Agreement, to redress the absence of multiparty
democracy for nearly forty years (Geldenhuys, 2000: 48). At the same time the
Lusaka Agreement stipulates the involvement of the international community, in
the form of all associated regional actors, to work co-operatively to secure
common borders (Wolpe, 2000: 34), and one of its key aspects is its provision for
the disarming of foreign armed groups functioning in the Congo, posing a threat
to their host, and their countries of origin (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 1).
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As Wolpe (2000: 33) states, the significance of the Lusaka Agreement "lies in its
embrace of all of the critical elements of a sustainable resolution of the Great
Lakes Crisis" because it advocates the respect for sovereignty of all the regional
states while aspiring to establish credible and inclusive institutions in the DRC.
The Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of representatives of the
various belligerents, and responsible for the implementation of the Ceasefire
Agreement until such time as the UN peacekeeping force was deployed (Malan &
Boshoff, 2002: 1), formed an integral part of the success of the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement (Wolpe, 2000: 37). The JMC chaired by Algerian General Rashid
Lallali, would be liable for the restoration of trust and confidence between parties.
International support and resources are necessary for the JMC to succeed
(Wolpe, 2000: 37). Ultimately, the JMC would work with the assistance of the UN
and the OAU to establish mechanisms for "the tracking, disarming, cantoning and
documenting of all armed groups in the DRC" (Friman, 2001: 68).
The Agreement only took effect on 31 August 1999, since the initial signatories of
July io" did not include any of the Congolese rebel groups (Malan & Boshoff,
2002: 3). Fighting between government and rebel forces was, however, still
raging in December (Geldenhuys, 2000: 44). Although the ceasefire was in
place, countless violations persisted from all sides, and thus the conditions
stipulated by the UN for a realistic deployment were not met (Masire, 2001: 1).
As a result, the UN has not been willing to deploy a credible military force to the
DRC to enforce, or even verify, compliance with the Lusaka Agreement (Malan &
Boshoff, 2002: 1).
Demands for changes to the Lusaka Agreement have been made, and the DRC
government expressed doubts about certain aspects of the Agreement, stating
that it was primarily a ceasefire with the democratisation process as an appendix
(Masire, 2001: 2). Others maintained that the Agreement gave foreigners too
much say, and excluded civil society (Masire, 2001: 2). Furthermore, the
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Agreement did not establish a truth and reconciliation commission (Geldenhuys,
2000: 49), and omitted compensation for the victims of war (Masire, 2001: 2),
which was seen as unacceptable.
Yet another uncertainty surrounding the Agreement is that the guidelines and
structures it offers are very fragile. According to Malan and Boshoff (2002: 3), the
Lusaka Process ignored the finer details of the situation in the DRC in an attempt
to minimise problems, and placed tremendous expectations on a UN
peacekeeping force (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 3). Without including the UN in
negotiations, the brokers of the agreement still counted on the UN to perform a
multitude of difficult and complicated tasks, not knowing whether these tasks
would be operationally achievable (Malan & Boshoff, 2001: 3-4).
Even if all the necessary parties have signed the Agreement, it does not suggest
that peace and stability will automatically follow. Malan and Boshoff (2002: 3)
assert that "diplomatic activity should not be mistaken for actual achievement".
A positive consequence of the Lusaka Agreement was the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue (ICO) held at South Africa's Sun City resort. The goal of these talks was
to negotiate a peaceful transition to democracy for the DRC (Mseteka, 2002: 6).
In the run-up to the talks, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) said it
would boycott the event, because of insufficient representation for the opposition
political parties (Mseteka, 2002: 6). The same questions of disarmament and the
withdrawal of foreign troops from the Congo that hindered the Lusaka
Agreement, surfaced again as a major factor in the derailment of the ICO (Malan
& Boshoff, 2002: 1).
ICO negotiations were held and led to a partial agreement between Bemba's
MLC and Joseph Kabila's government (Cornwell, 2002: 41). The negotiations
lasted seven weeks and the agreement, reached on 19th April 2002, represented
the end of the ICO (Cornwell, 2002: 41). The government and the MLC
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announced that they would install a transitional government in Kinshasa on 15
May 2002 and declared the Lusaka Accords complete (Cornwell, 2002: 41).
Further attempts to arrange additional talks have failed and although the ICO has
officially ended, confusion about the DRC's future remains (Cornwell, 2002: 41).
The regional co-operation portrayed in the ICO played an important role in
addressing and working towards a resolution of the conflict, but the fact that
Zimbabwe and Angola, as SADC members, refused to withdraw their troops
(Mseteka, 2002: 6), still indicates that a state-centric attitude prevails. Unilateral
interests, especially evident in the continual mineral exploitation by the foreign
armies in the DRC, remain dominant. In the end the Lusaka Peace Process
constitutes a combination of mostly bilateral agreements, and although regional
co-operation was present at times, it was not a SADC-inspired procedure.
4.5 The Pretoria Agreement: July 2002
The latest peace deal for the DRC has come in the form of the Pretoria
Agreement, which by overcoming the deadlock of the lCD, restores credibility in
the Lusaka Agreement (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 10). During these proceedings a
memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between the governments of
the DRC and Rwanda on 30th July 2002 (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 1). The MoU,
concerned with the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from DRC territory and the
dismantling of the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the DRC, has been
praised as an end to the war (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 1).
The Pretoria Agreement does present an acknowledgement by the DRC
government that it had been supporting the Interhamwe and ex-FAR and that it
will cease such support, while Rwanda, who has been brought back to the peace
process, has committed itself to the withdrawal of forces from the DRC (Malan &
Boshoff, 2002: 7&10). On account of this, both Uganda and Zimbabwe have
announced that they intend to withdraw their troops from the DRC as soon as
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Aside from the advantages and disadvantages of the Pretoria Agreement, the
actuality of the deal being a South African initiative remains (Malan & Boshoff,
2002: 1-2). The Agreement was brokered by South African President Thabo
Mbeki, and the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Although the Agreement may
bring stability to the region, it does not hide the fact that it was arranged through
a bilateral initiative, and that once again regional co-operation in the initiation of
solutions to the ORe conflict was non-existent.
possible (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 10). A substantial problem with the Pretoria
Agreement, however, is that it may break down over issues of implementation,
since South Africa does not have an effective military expeditionary capability
(Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 10).
4.6 Assessment
The many initiatives and agreements, aimed at bringing an end to the conflict in
the ORe, although partially successful, did not present Southern Africa with a
concerted regional effort. SAOC, the region's only arrangement equipped to deal
with conflicts, had very little relevance in the process of bringing peace to the
region. It's OPOS was non-existent at the start of the second rebellion in the
ORe.
According to the conception of new regionalism, SADe members should have
co-operated regionally to consider a course of action that would have best suited
the region in its entirety. This was clearly not the case, indicating that individual
SADe member states were not ready to relinquish sovereignty and work towards
an integrated Southern African region. A state-centric approach to conflict in the
ORC prevailed, denoting the presence of old regionalism ideas.
In exception to the Lusaka Agreement, that involved non-state actors, no other
initiatives showed any signs of attempting to include civil society in negotiations.
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All the initiatives discussed in the chapter were state-led and state-centric. This
should not have been the case for either a broader approach to security or new
regionalism, as both concepts advocate the importance of the inclusion of civil
society.
Furthermore, participating parties did not consider the region as a whole, but
attempted rather to tackle the internal conflict in the ORC, without realising that
the conflict had unflagging regional proportions as well. Peace and stability in the
Congo will be fickle, unless echoed in neighbouring countries particularly
considering the nature of broader human threats found in the conflict. Besides
the fact that SAOC as a regional arrangement should have maintained its
regional approach, regional-co-operation should have been promoted for the
reason that the conflict in the Congo had not obeyed national boundaries, and
therefore required a regional solution.
Principles of regional co-operation were not adhered to, and in reality SAOC
members legitimised their unilateral involvement in the ORC, by using the lack of
clarity in the SAOC structures. The lack of a functioning regional security
initiative, one with clearly laid out principles, led to unilateral involvement and a
complication of the conflict, and an ultimate failure to address and resolve it
successfully.
Ketumile Masire (2001: 3) writes that the multitude of initiatives by both African
and international actors, all aimed at putting an end to the continuing instability
and conflict in the ORC, have in actual fact complicated the matter. It has
resulted in a lack of focus, incoherency and a waste of precious time.
The Lusaka Agreement has been a monumental first step, since it shows the
value of the need for a common regional goal to address regional security
challenges (Wolpe, 2000: 40). Also, the Agreement has provided a tremendous
opportunity to establish credible political institutions within the ORC, while
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constructing a regional arrangement to address the common security issues of
the regional states (Wolpe, 2000: 34). In accordance to the notion of human
security, however, states should not be seen as the only referents of security.
The Pretoria Agreement is very important for President Mbeki, since it is his first
peacemaking success in his capacity as chair of the AU (Malan & Boshoff, 2002:
2). Again in defiance of the broader human security, however, the Agreement
was state-initiated and state-centered. The Pretoria Agreement did succeed in
bringing previously unco-operative parties to the negotiation table, but failed to
include civil society.
As far as SADC is concerned, if members had wanted to intervene for reasons of
wanting to stop ongoing violence in the DRC they could have done so without
military intervention. In fact, a military outcome will not produce the lasting peace
required for reconstruction (Naidoo, 2000: 86). All the foreign parties involved
had separate personal interests, and because of this they helped fuel the conflict
instead of putting a stop to it (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 207-208). Bilateral
involvement in conflict, especially as a result of personal economic or political
interest, should not be tolerated. If the members are truly committed to attaining
regional integration they have to be willing to make some national sacrifices for
the good of the region as a whole. Tsie (1999: 10) is quite right in saying that in
future situations SADC should only intervene in regional conflicts "to restore
stability and peace with the primary purpose of creating a climate conducive to
the peaceful settlement of conflict".
Furthermore, SADC and its Organ for Politics, Defence and Security need to
establish a clear mandate on intervention, and determine at what levels
intervention will take place. Above all they must follow the rules set out by the
international community. The more effective the regional effort, the less
jurisdiction there will be for unilateral intervention (Wolpe, 2000: 32).
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Combined with this, SADC should have immediately set down ground rules for
Kabila's government, in an attempt to establish a common set of values for the
region. This would have forced him to uphold certain principles in the
establishment of a new government. One of the greatest mistakes that SADC
made was to give Kabila free reign without ever directly demanding that he
comply with the terms of a democracy. SADC could have easily made
democratic governance in the DRC a conditionality, in return for the assistance
he received from various SADCmembers.
The people of the Congo and the Great Lakes region have experienced war,
hunger, ethnic persecution and dictatorship. Their security concerns have been
ignored countless times. Their interest must be put first and their security
guaranteed. Any other attitude should not be tolerated.
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Chapter 5:
Conclusion
The introductory chapter outlined the security problems prevalent in Southern
Africa. Various states have, and still are, experiencing violent hostilities
detrimental to economic growth and political stability, and devastating to the lives
of the inhabitants. It is stated that most of the conflicts are of such a nature that
they transcend the traditional notion of security, namely security of the state. In
fact both the state and their people that are in danger. The understanding of
security must shift from the statist perspective to that of broader human security
concerns.
The threats prevalent in Southern Africa, and indeed the whole of Africa, present
a challenge for the entire region because of their borderless characteristics. No
longer can states approach and solve regional issues and conflicts, through
national policies alone. Against the background of the new and human notion of
security, it appears that regional approaches and, therefore, regional co-
operation are necessary for regional conflicts.
In view of the above, the topic of the thesis was concerned with the assessment
of the role of regional co-operation in the resolution of the conflict in the DRe,
with an understanding of the importance of the concepts of new regionalism and
new security.
The second chapter, saw the examination of regionalism as a concept, to
establish the differences between old and new regionalism. This led to the
conclusion that the world has evolved from simple co-operative agreements and
alliances, to a concept where regionalism indicates an increased interest to co-
operate and integrate in order to attain peace and stability. This willingness to
integrate has been particularly evident in the wake of globalisation, where states
have felt threatened when attempting to address global challenges due to
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insufficient resources or the nature of these challenges. For Southern Africa,
forming regional alliances has been of importance to prevent the ongoing
marginalisation of the developing world, since the end of the Cold War Era. The
new wave of regionalism has also brought with it an understanding of the
importance of actors outside the realm of government. Civil society, in the form of
the business sector and non-governmental organisations, can serve and must
serve to integrate the region because of their focus beyond national boundaries.
Secondly, the concept of security was examined. It was determined that the
concept has evolved significantly from a narrow confine referring to national
security, to a new thinking that places emphasis on the security of people.
Security is the pursuit of freedom from threat, and threats present in Southern
Africa are not ones that face the state but rather the people. States or national
governments should no longer be the main recipients of security. Threats to
human security, if not addressed, will resurface with growing fatality.
A link was established between the new wave of regionalism and the new human
approach to security. If the threats identified are not confined to national
boundaries, national efforts will not address them adequately. Furthermore, the
consequences of conflict also have a tendency to cross national borders, and the
notion of spillover has becomevery evident particularly in Southern Africa.
The third chapter examined the security structures present on the African
continent, namely: the United Nations, with its responsibility to maintain
international peace and security, and the Southern African Development
Community, concerned with addressing economic, political and security
challenges in the sub-region, and the only regional arrangement equipped to deal
with conflicts.
This chapter determined that both organisations required revision because of the
constantly changing political, social and economic environments. Although SADC
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has recently decided on more centralised structures, this is yet to become
evident in the realm of security. The United Nations remains unchanged since its
inception. Also the United Nations has shown increasing political unwillingness
as far as missions in Africa are concerned. At the same time Africa has shown
substantial interest to embrace peacekeeping but continue to rely heavily on UN
support.
Through an examination of the mechanisms for peace and security, of the above
mentioned organisations, it was determined that both have remained state-
centric, and that the concept of old regionalism with its statist perspective
dominates. Due to the statist attitude, it has become difficult for them to adopt the
new and broader approaches to security, and regional threats remain
unattended. The UN and SADe are not fully co-ordinated in their functioning,
despite the requirements for the latter to adhere to the rules and regulations of
the former. If the organisations were to improve their collaboration, they would be
able to address each other's shortcomings and weaknesses. It was, therefore,
determined that a layered response system is the only way forward regarding
African peacekeeping. Such a system will require more communication and
interaction between the organisations.
After an examination of the conflict in the ORe, as the designated case study for
the thesis, it was established that the conflict was far beyond a national dilemma,
and it had attributes of a national and regional nature. The conflict is not one
dimensional, and has regional causes and consequences, affecting the security
of states and people, in the whole region. In order to find a lasting peace, the
region has to co-operate to find a solution for the entire region.
This was often not the case judging on the initiatives in the ORe conflict. There
was a great deal of unilateral involvement for the sake of own and national
interests. Initiatives were always state-initiated and state-led, with no SAOe-
inspired activity. Parties to the conflict did not act together and at times certain
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belligerents were not willing to take part in negotiations. SADC could not even
establish an initial common stance on the DRC conflict. Coupled with this,
negotiations were primarily aimed at governments, and civil society was not
invited to take part.
Initiatives in the Congo have not taken the regional nature of the conflict into
account, and throughout the process a common position has not been
developed. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, as the only real attempt at
regional co-operation, did involve all parties to the conflict and saw the ceasefire
as a solution to the conflict. It did not, however, address the underlying problems
of threats to human security, such as ethnic discrimination. The interests of the
people of the region should have been made the principle objective. Also, despite
its certain level of regional success, it was not initiated by SADC.
Furthermore, it has been very difficult to generate the much needed international
involvement and interest in the Great Lakes conflict. Western involvement has
been waning and human security appears to be unable to generate the interest
that is required.
There is a need for a functioning regional security organisation in Southern
Africa, due to the regional nature of the conflicts. Such an arrangement could
also allow for less dependent on UN, which as evident does have certain flaws
regarding integration with regional organisations and shows a lack of interest in
SouthernAfrica. But regional security initiatives will not be successful unless they
exhibit characteristics of new security and new regionalism, because without
these concepts they will be continually dominated by state-interests.
A working regional security mechanism is of utmost importance, one that will
include all parties in the region, including civil society, and will provide the region
with a regional perspective to regional problems.
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Regional co-operation remains the only way forward if conflict situations are to be
addressed and resolved successfully, but in order for regional initiatives to be
effective they will have to be taken seriously. Regional co-operation and
integration requires a region to develop common goals and values, and this has
not occurred in Southern Africa. Common objectives, although evident on paper,
have not transpired through actions, and individual states have acted unilaterally
for the sake of private interests.
Due to SAOC's lack of regional engagement in the ORC conflict, it is even
doubtful whether Southern Africa exhibits qualities that could lead to regionness
or whether the region is homogenous enough to co-operate and integrate. More
research should be carried out to determine whether the region does
demonstrate the will and common values that are necessary for any working
regional security arrangement.
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